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Pursuant to Utah Appellate Rule 24(b), the Appellees, Armand L. Smith,
individually and as Trustee and Virginia L. Smith, an individual ("Smiths"),
herewith submit this Appellees' Brief answering the Opening Brief of Appellant,
Utah State Treasurer, filed November 19, 2004.
ISSUES ON APPEAL RAISED BY STATE TREASURER
The issues in this appeal are those raised by the State Treasurer's Opening
Brief, but the constitutional issues can be more accurately and precisely framed:
1. Was the District Court Correct in Holding That the Punitive Damage
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) Is Unconstitutional Under the Utah
and United States Constitutions As a "Taking" of the Smiths'
Constitutionally Vested Property Rights in the June 29, 2001 Final
Punitive Damage Judgment?
a. Was the District Court Correct in Concluding that the Punitive
Damage Statute § 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Give the State
Treasurer any Interest in the Punitive Damages Judgment, and
that the State Treasurer's Claim to Fifty Percent of the Punitive
Damage Award Did Not Mature and Was Not Triggered Until the
Punitive Damage "Award" Was "Paid"?
2. Although It Was Not Necessary for the District Court to Reach the
Additional Constitutional Issues, Does the Punitive Damage Statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989) Also Violate the Separation of Powers
Articles V and VIII of the Utah Constitution or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution or Art. I,
Sec. 24 of the Utah Constitution?
3. Alternatively Only, if the State Treasurer is Found to be Entitled to a Net
Fifty Percent of the Punitive Award, Is the State Treasurer Also Entitled
to the $560,020 of Statutory Interest on the Judgment Against Price
Development Co.?

1

The Smiths are in agreement with the State Treasurer that it has preserved
each of these issues on appeal at the trial court and that the standard of review
by this Court is one of correctness.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL
1. Punitive Damage Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as
originally enacted, annexed as Attachment 1.
2. Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22, annexed as Attachment 2.
3. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment annexed as Attachment 3.
4. New 2004 Punitive Damage Statute and Enrolled Bill, S.B. 201, annexed as
Attachment 4.
5. Utah Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 1, annexed as Attachment 5.
6. Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 24, annexed as Attachment 6.
7. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1 and Art. VIII, Sec. 7, annexed as
Attachment 7.
8. Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution
Attachment 8.

annexed

as

STATEMENT OF CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
This appeal is before this Court from the District Court's Rule 54(b)
Summary Judgment Order of June 24, 2004 declaring Utah Code Ann § 78-181(3) (1989) unconstitutional and unenforceable as a "taking," contrary to United
States and Utah Constitutions, of the Smiths' constitutionally vested property
rights in the compensatory and punitive damage judgment of the District Court
dated June 29, 2001. In large part, the State Treasurer's Statement of the Case and

2

Facts are reasonably accurate as far as it goes, and the Smiths submit this
Statement as a chronological supplement:
1. On June 29, 2001 based upon a unanimous jury verdict, District Judge
Noel entered judgment in favor of the Smiths and against Price
Development Company (n/k/a/ Fairfax Realty Co.) of $1,100,000
compensatory damages and $5,500,000 punitive damages:
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED .. .
4. That on the Special Verdict of the Jury Re: Punitive
Damages for breach of fiduciary duty, judgment be,
and the same is hereby entered, in favor of Armand L.
Smith, individually and as Trustee for the Armand L.
Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon S. Windham Trust,
and Virginia L. Smiths, and against Price Development
Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in the sum and
amount of $5,500,000 . . . ." R. 4504.
2. This Court, by unanimous decision of October 3, 2003, affirmed in all
respects the June 29, 2001 judgment. R. 4559-4577.
3. Price Development filed a certiorari petition in the United States Supreme
Court on or about January 26, 2004, opposed by the Smiths, that was
denied on March 29, 2004. R. 5309. This Court issued its Remittitur back
to the trial court on the following day, March 30, 2004. R. 4592.
4. Neither the State Treasurer nor the Attorney General attempted to
intervene in the case at any time to assert any interest in the June 29, 2001
judgment. Upon Smiths' Motion for Joinder filed in early April 2004, the
District Court on April 14, 2004 joined the Utah State Treasurer as a Rule

3

19 Additional Defendant for purposes of determining the constitutionality
of the punitive damage statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989). That
section provides with respect to a punitive damage award:
"in any judgment where punitive damages are awarded
and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages
in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys'
fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for
deposit into the General Fund."
5.

Although § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was amended in other particulars in 1991
and 2002, the Smiths and the State Treasurer agreed that the applicable
statute at the date of judgment was the 1989 statute. State Br. @ 3, 5; R.
5237, 5345.

6. On April 14, 2004, the State Treasurer appeared orally before the District
Court and asserted a net 50% interest, after attorneys' fees, in the punitive
damage award, based upon § 78-18-1(3) (1989). The Smiths and the State
Treasurer stipulated with Court approval that 50% of the punitive damage
award (less $20,000) or $2,740,000, together with statutory interest on that
portion of the punitive damage award, or $560,020, would be placed with a
neutral depository pending a determination of the constitutionality of § 7818-1(3) (1989). R. 4695-4699.
7. On April 30, 2004, the Smiths filed a motion for summary judgment
against the

State Treasurer to declare

§ 78-18-1(3)

(1989)

as

unconstitutional and unenforceable; and alternatively, for the award of
statutory interest on the judgment, upon the following legal bases:
4

(1) the entire June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment vested on that date
as a constitutional property right in the Smiths, with interest thereon,
which they, alone, were entitled to enforce and recover against Price
Development. Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) requiring that a net 50% of
the punitive damage "award" be remitted to the State Treasurer when
"paid" by Price Development, constituted a "taking" of Smiths' vested
property rights in the judgment, contrary to the "Taking Clause" of the
U. S. Constitution and Art. 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution;
(2) Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is unconstitutional as in violation of the
Separation of Powers Articles, Art. V Sec. 1, and Art. VIII Sec. 1 and 7
of the Utah Constitution which forbids the Legislature

from

diminishing, degrading or changing a final and vested judgment of the
Judicial Branch;
(3) Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is discriminatory in attempting to set over to
the State Treasurer 50% of a punitive damage judgment in a business
fraud/breach of fiduciary duty case while not affecting settlements on
statutory punitive damage judgments such as the State antitrust laws
under § 76-10-919(l)(b)5 and therefore it denies to the Smiths the Equal
Protection of the Law under the Utah and U. S. Constitutions;
(4) alternatively, but in all events, even if § 76-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld,
the Smiths were entitled to the interest on the judgment which was
distinct from the "payment" of the punitive damage "award."
5

R. 5226-5229.
8.

Smiths' principal argument that § 78-18-1(1) (1989) was unconstitutional
under the "Taking Clause" was predicated on the basis that the State
Treasurer had only a claim to the punitive damage "award" and then not
until it was "paid." "Payment" came years after the punitive damage
judgment constitutionally vested as a guaranteed property right in the
Smiths. R. 5242-5251.

9.

As evidence of the "taking" argument, the Smiths argued the likelihood
that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") would take the position that the
entire $5,500,000 punitive damage judgment had vested in the Smiths and
was taxable to them as ordinary income under the Alternative Minimum
Tax ("AMT"), even if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld as constitutional
and a net 50% of the judgment, viz., $2,740,000 was paid to the State
Treasurer. Case precedent and Congressional proceedings suggest this
result, which would be financially ruinous to the Smiths and emasculate
the Utah legal policy of punitive damages. R. 5254-5257.

10. In further support that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was a "taking," the Smiths
pointed to the 2004 amendment to § 78-18-1(3) (2004) by the Utah
Legislature which, inter alia, made the State Treasurer, for the first time,
a vested judgment creditor in any punitive damage judgment entered
by a district court, with right to execute on the punitive judgment with
"equal standing and footing" with the plaintiff judgment creditor. The
6

Smiths argued that the 2004 amendment was substantive and structural
giving the State Treasurer for the first time a vested interest in the
judgment. See Addendum 4; R. 5252-5254.
11. The State Treasurer argued that under § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the punitive
damage judgment was "divided" between the State Treasurer and the
Smiths "at the time of the entry of judgment," that Smiths only became
"vested" in 50% of the punitive damage judgment when entered and
therefore, there was no "taking" of Smiths' vested rights in the judgment.
R. 5350-5352. The Treasurer did not dispute that the State had no rights
to enforce or execute on the judgment, and only addressed in passing the
IRS federal income tax consequences of the vesting of 100% of the
judgment in the Smiths. R. 5365. The Treasurer argued that the 2004
amendment to § 78-18-1(3) (1989) by the Legislature was only a
clarification and not a substantive change in the statute. R. 5364-5365.
12. As to the alternative issue of interest on the punitive damage judgment,
the Smiths argued that even if the punitive damage statute were upheld,
the State's alleged interest did not trigger until the punitive damage award
was paid. Accordingly, the Smiths were entitled in all events, to the
statutory interest on the entire punitive damage judgment from entry to
the date of payment against Price Development in favor of the Smiths. R.
5274-5275. The State Treasurer opposed also this alternative motion. R.
5365-5366.
7

13. After oral argument, District Judge Noel issued the court order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Smiths and declaring § 78-18-1(3)
(1989) unconstitutional in violation of the Taking Clauses of the Federal
and State Constitutions. The Court in the written order stated:
4. That the statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as enacted in
1989, on its face clearly does not give the State
Treasurer or the State of Utah any interest in the
Judgment of this Court when first issued, nor does it
give the State any interest in the underlying cause of
action. The State's interest is triggered when and if the
punitive damage Judgment is "paid" to the payee,
Judgment creditor in this case, the Smiths. To do as
the State suggests, and rule that the statute gives the
State an interest in the Judgment when first issued,
would require this Court to read something into the
statute that simply is not there. This the Court is
unwilling to do.
5. That the Smiths' property interests in the entire
Judgment which are entitled to constitutional
protection, vested in the Judgment as of the date of its
entry on June 29, 2001.
6. That Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as enacted in
1989, constitutes a "taking" by the State of Utah of the
Smiths' vested property interests in the Judgment of
this Court, which is prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution made
applicable to the State through the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as Art I, Sec. 22 of the Utah
Constitution. After having reached this conclusion,
however, this Court makes no determination as to the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as
amended by the 2004 Legislature." R. 5429-5430.
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14. The District Court did not find it necessary to reach the Separation of
Powers, the Equal Protection, or judgment interest arguments of Smiths'
motion for summary judgment. R. 5430-5431.
15. From the summary judgment order made final under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), the State Treasurer takes this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court order determining that Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3)
(1989) was unconstitutional should be affirmed for essential constitutional
reasons.

The statute constitutes a "taking" of Smiths' constitutionally vested

property rights in the final punitive damage judgment of the Court in violation of
Article I, Sec. 22 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Additionally, the statute is

constitutionally flawed in violation of the Separation of Powers, Article V and
Article VIII of the Utah Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal and State Charters.
The June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment of $5,500,000 entered against
Price Development and in favor of the Smiths only, was final, absolute,
unqualified and unconditional. The Smiths are the judgment creditors in 100% of
the punitive damage judgment which they enforced and defended against Price
Development on appeal in this Court and on certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) attempts to require Smiths, years after the final
judgment has vested in and been defended and enforced by Smiths, to remit 50%
9

of the punitive damage "award" to the State Treasurer if and when "paid" by Price
Development to the Smiths. The conclusion is inescapable that the statute is
conditional

upon the hypothesis

of payment

long after

the

judgment

constitutionally vested in the Smiths. While the cornerstone of constitutional
analysis is the "vesting" of the property rights in the final judgment, the State
Treasurer does not argue in this appeal that the final judgment ever vested in the
Treasurer. Rather, he contends that the Smiths "only became vested in 50% of the
final judgment" which judgment was somehow "divided" with the Treasurer when
entered.

The argument is a fiction that flies squarely in the face of the

constitutional "taking" prohibitions of the Utah and Federal Constitutions abovereferenced. The final vested punitive damage judgment was and is a property right
of the Smiths like any other property interest entitled to State and Federal
constitutional guarantees.
Added demonstration of the vesting of the full and final punitive damage
judgment in the Smiths is the distinct possibility that the Internal Revenue Service,
following established precedent, will tax, under the Alternative Minimum Tax, the
entire punitive damage judgment to the Smiths. If § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were held
constitutional herein, and the I.R.S. taxed the Smiths on the full judgment as it has
in other cases, the result would not only be financially ruinous to the Smiths, but it
would also scuttle this Court's legal policy on punitive damages.
In its recently concluded 2004 Session, the Utah Legislature fundamentally
changed § 78-18-1(3) (1989) to read the way the Treasurer would like to but
10

cannot now construe the 1989 statute. Section 78-18-1(3) (2004), for the first
time, makes the State Treasurer a judgment creditor of a post-May 2004 punitive
damage judgment on equal footing with the plaintiff to execute upon, enforce, and
settle the judgment.

The 2004 statute is an open acknowledgement of the

constitutional defects in § 78-18-1(3) (1989) before this Court.

In fact, the

Treasurer's appeal in this case essentially asks this Court to rewrite § 78-18-1(3)
(1989) so it reads as does § 78-18-1(3) (2004). The District Court expressly
declined to judicially amend the statute.
Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is also constitutionally flawed in violation of the
Separation of Powers Articles V and VIII of the Utah Constitution. At stake is the
strength, veracity and integrity of a final judgment of the Judicial Branch. The law
is firmly settled that the final punitive damage judgment herein vested in the
Smiths is the supreme act, the sine qua non, of the Judicial Department and it may
not be diluted, degraded, abrogated, or changed by the legislature. Section 78-181(3) (1989) is unconstitutional for attempting to do just that.
Further, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) will not stand constitutional scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Utah and Federal Constitutions.

The statute

unconstitutionally discriminates against those who recover a non-statutory
punitive damage judgment for deceit and breach of fiduciary duty and intentional
partnership asset conversion, vis-a-vis, those who obtain a statutory punitive
damage judgment in the form of treble damages for violation of Utah's antitrust
laws or other statutory punitive damage statutes.
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Lastly, and only in the alternative, were this Court to reverse and uphold
the constitutionality of § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Smiths would still be entitled to
the statutory interest payable by Price Development on the entire punitive damage
judgment, no part of which ever vested in the State Treasurer.

At best, the

Treasurer's entitlement is only to a net 50% of the punitive damage "award," if
and when "paid." It is only the punitive damage judgment, and not the "award"
which carries statutory interest.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND UNENFORCEABLE AS A "TAKING" OF THE SMITHS'
CONSTITUTIONALLY VESTED RIGHTS IN THE FINAL JUNE 29,
2001 PUNITIVE DAMAGE JUDGMENT, IN VIOLATION OF THE
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
1. The June 29, 2001 Judgment Vested a Constitutional Property Right in
the Smiths to the Entire Punitive Damage Judgment Including
Interest.
The State Treasurer's statement is correct that the

constitutional

interpretation of a statute is ordinarily to be gauged by its plain meaning.1 (App.
Br. at 9). However, "[i]t is of course true that a law that impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is
presumptively unconstitutional."

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76

(1980) (citations omitted).

1

While indirectly referencing legislative history, the Treasurer states emphatically
that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) is not ambiguous and is to be interpreted by its plain
meaning. State Br. @ 10. The Smiths agree. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29 ^ 20.
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In the constitutional context, it is undeniable that the Smiths' property
interests vested in the entire punitive damage judgment when it was entered on
June 29, 2001. The judgment was indivisible, entered only in favor of and to be
enforced by the Smiths, and was constitutionally protected property as much as
any other real or personal property right. The punitive damage judgment "is as
much an article of property as anything else that a party owns."

State of

Louisiana, ex rel. v. Mayor and Administrators of the City of New Orleans, 109
U.S. 285, 291 (1883). That property right in the entire judgment could have been
executed upon only by the Smiths, and sold, assigned or mortgaged by them in the
same way as other real or personal property. Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102,
123-24 (1898); Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1981).
When the judgment was entered in favor of the Smiths and against Price
Development on June 29, 2001, nothing else, in fact or law, was required as a
condition to the Smiths' constitutional vesting in the judgment. The integrity of
that final judgment, as affirmed by this Court, is collaterally attacked by the State
Treasurer's argument in this appeal that only 50% of the punitive damage
judgment vested in the Smiths in consequence of § 78-18-1(3) (1989). That claim
came as a surprise to the District Court which found not only that the State
Treasurer is not named or anywhere to be found, even impliedly, in the judgment,
but also that both the punitive damage judgment and the statute would have to be
rewritten to say what they plainly do not say.
13

The very integrity of final judgments in the State of Utah is in jeopardy in
this appeal. This Court has stated that a final judgment is an act of the Judicial
Department which is the absolute disposition of the rights of the interested parties:
"A judgment or decree duly entered, establishes in the most
authentic form, that which had theretofore been in dispute, or
unsettled or uncertain. . . . Since the parties submitted to the court
the resolution of their disputes and the determination of their rights
and liabilities, that resolution when entered as a judgment
conclusively binds them. Such questions may not again be litigated;
they have been adjudicated for all time, and are fused into the
judgment or decree."
Adams v. Davies, 156 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1945). "A judgment is the final
determination of the rights of the parties." Lukich v. Utah Construction Co., 150
P.2d 298 (Utah 1915).
"[T]he finality of a judgment must be respected in order to insure the
rights of parties. . . . Litigation must be put to an end, and it is the
function of a final judgment to do just that. A judgment is the final
consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it
in an action or proceeding."
Crofts v. Crofts. 445 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1968). "If the language of judgment is
clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as it speaks."

Park City Utah

Corporation v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).
The constitutionally protected property rights of Smiths in the final June 29,
2001 Judgment cannot be taken or damaged by the State Treasurer without
compensation. Both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, Penn Central
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Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 122, and Article I, Sec. 22 of the Utah
Constitution contain a simple but eloquent prohibition:
" . . . nor shall private property be taken for a public use, without just
compensation."
Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."
Art. I, Sec. 22, Utah Constitution.
The finality of the judgment, vesting in Smiths the rights of the judgment
creditor who has obtained the judgment, may not by prior or subsequent statute of
the Legislature be taken away, diminished, degraded or eliminated. The United
States Supreme Court in the early case of McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102,
123-24 (1898), stated the now long-recognized rule:
"It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which
have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on
subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when these
actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to
disturb the rights created thereby ceases."
Id. at 123-24. The rule in McCullough is embedded in the law governing the
constitutional rights of the Smiths before this Court and it has echoed down
through the years.2 In Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., Inc., 14 F.3rd 486 (10th Cir.

2

Not only do rights that have become vested by a judgment constitute property
"protected from legislative interference," but an attachment or lien "entitling a
creditor to resort to property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property right
protected by the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Board of Educ. of City of
Chicago, 588 F.Supp. 132, 235 (N.D. 111. 1984).
15

1993), cert, denied 514 U.S. 1082 (1995), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized the validity of the doctrine:
"The nature of the vested rights doctrine is twofold. The doctrine
has a due process component premised upon the acknowledgment
that once rights are fixed by judgment, they are a form of property
over which the legislature has no greater power than it has over any
other form of property. Axel Johnson v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6
F.3d 78 (2nd Cir. 1993); Tonya K. v. Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243,
1247-48 (7th Cir. 1988); see also, Taxpayers for A nimus-La Plata
Referendum v. Animus-La Plata Water Conservancy, 739 F.2d 1472,
1477 (10th cir. 1984) ("the TSupremel Court has indicated that it
would not allow a legislature to interfere with an adjudicated right").
In cases involving Congress and the federal judiciary, the vested
rights doctrine also has a separation of power component which
prevents Congress from sitting as a 'court of errors' with the powers
to suspend or revise final judgments of the federal courts." (Some
citations omitted).
Id. at 490-491 (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit in Johnston went on to cite with approval McCullough in
stating:
"The case perhaps most often cited for the vested rights doctrine is
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24, 43 L.Ed. 382\ 19 S.
Ct. 134 (1898), in which the Supreme Court held that the Legislature
lacks the power to take away rights that have been vested by final
judgment."
Id. at 491. The Tenth Circuit then stated the accepted principle:
"In fact, the Court has reiterated the vested rights principle
underlying McCullough on several occasions. See, e.g., Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 113, 92 L. Ed. 568, 68 S. Ct. 431 (1948) ('judgments within the
powers vested in [Article Three] courts. . . may not be unlawfully
revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another
Department of Government5); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, 603,
67 L. Ed. 819, 43 S.Ct. 435 (1923) ('the private rights of parties
which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken
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away by subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by
the court regardless of such legislation'); Stephens v. Cherokee
Nation, 174 US 445, 478, 43 L.Ed. 1041, 19 S Ct. 722 (1899) ('it is
undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of
courts'); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48,
22 L.Ed. 772 (1875) (invalidating attempt by Congress to revise a
final judgment entered by the Court of Claims because 'where no
appeal is taken to [Supreme Court], [such judgments] are,, under
existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of the parties,
unless a new trial is granted by [Claims] court')' Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (1 How.) 421, 431, 15
L.Ed. 435 (1855) ('[an] act of Congress cannot have the effect and
operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered or the
rights determined thereby'); Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
760, 768, 12 L.Ed 903 (1849) ('no legislative act can change the
rights and liabilities of parties which have been established by
solemn judgment')."
Id. at 491.
The property rights of the individual, as vested in the final judgment here,
have high constitutional priority before this Court and the United States Supreme
Court. BertagnoH v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (1950); Movie et al. v. Salt Lake
City, 176 P.2d 882, 885(1947).
"[A]ll history shows that rights of persons are unsafe where property
is insecure. Protection to one goes with protection to the other; and
there can be neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation of
all just government is unsettled. . . ."
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 767 (1879). It cannot be disputed, in law, that
on June 29, 2001 the Smiths, and only the Smiths, became vested as the judgment
creditor in the final judgment.
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2. Under Sec. 78-18-1(3) (1989), the State Treasurer's Entitlement to Any
Punitive Damage Award Does Not Arise Until and is Only Triggered
By an "Award" Being "Paid."
The State Treasurer argues that the plain meaning under the statute is that
the Treasurer obtains an interest in a net 50% of punitive damages "where
awarded and paid" with the monies to be remitted to the State Treasurer for
general fund use. State Br. @ 10-11. The problem with the Treasurer's argument
is that the statute plainly does not say either what the Treasurer would like it to
say or what it must say in order for the Treasurer's argument to succeed. The
section clearly contemplates an entitlement to a punitive damage award, not
judgment, but only if the punitive award is ever paid. The section states:
"In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid,
50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000
shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund." (Emphasis added
and bolded).
§78-18-1(3) (1989).
Troubling questions plague the Treasurer's arguments, the answers of
which unravel his position. To begin with, when does the Treasurer claim that its
50% interest "vested"? Also, vested in what? As to the first query, the Treasurer
admits that the statute is silent and, in fact, contains no language as to when he
acquires his claimed 50% interest in the judgment. State Br. @ 11. Nowhere in
the Treasurer's Brief does he claim (much less explain when or how) the
Treasurer's interest ever "vested."
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As to the second query, there are no vested rights of the Treasurer in any
judgment at any time, but only at some unknown future date and then only if a
punitive damage award is paid. In order for a property right or interest to vest in a
judgment of a court in Utah, there must be no other condition or hypothesis to be
satisfied before the interest can vest. A future and speculative interest does not
rise or equate to a present, vested right. State of Arizona v. Estes Corp., 558 P.2d
714, 716 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1976) ("rights are not vested if they are qualified by
contingencies"); Vaughn v. Nadel & Gussman Partnership, 618 P.2d 778, 783
(Kan. 1980) ("a vested right is a right so fixed that it is not dependent on any
future act, contingency or decision to make it more secure.").
Still other questions undercut the State Treasurer's position.

If, as the

Treasurer argues, the Smiths' property rights constitutionally vested in only 50%
of the final punitive damage judgment, how could the Smiths enforce against Price
Development by threatened execution, and then defend on appeal, 100% of the
punitive damage judgment? Could the State Treasurer, under § 78-18-1(3) (1989),
enforce by execution or defend on appeal the claimed net 50% of the punitive
judgment against Price Development? If Price Development had attempted to
discharge the punitive damage judgment in bankruptcy, would the State Treasurer
have been entitled to enforce the judgment as a creditor of Price Development?
Was the Treasurer

ever

a judgment

creditor

of Price

Development?

Hypothetically, if the Smiths agreed to settle the case with Price Development for
the amount of the compensatory damages and waived the punitive damage
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judgment, would the State Treasurer have had the right to block the settlement and
enforce its claimed interest against the judgment debtor, Price Development?

If

not in the Smiths, where is this second 50% interest in the punitive damage
judgment vested? Surely not in the Treasurer for the reasons already advanced.
Was the 50% interest placed in a black void or in perpetual animated suspension?
These questions will not go away.
In point of law, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) and the vested rights doctrine
established more than a century ago compel the conclusion that the State Treasurer
never became vested in the punitive damage judgment of the District Court.
Rather, the Treasurer only becomes entitled under the statute to a net 50% punitive
damage "award" when and if "paid." That attempted entitlement is conditional
and a hypothesis that has nothing to do with the Smiths' constitutionally vested
rights in the entire June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment. The Legislature did
not provide in § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as it could have, that the Treasurer would be
named as a judgment creditor in the punitive damage judgment as was done in the
2004 legislation.
In order for the State Treasurer to prevail he must ask this Court to rewrite
78-18-1(3) (1989) to say what the Legislature clearly did not say. This Court
should decline that request just as the experienced District Judge declined herein.
See Order of Noel, J. 1f 4; R. 5427-5432.

20

3. Case Precedent Supports the Unconstitutionality of §78-18-lf3) (1989)
As a "Taking" of Smiths9 Vested Rights in the Punitive Damage
Judgment.
The constitutional difficulties facing § 78-18-1(3) (1989) are strikingly
comparable to the Colorado punitive damage statute struck down by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991).
In Kirk, a 1987 punitive damage statute in Colorado provided that one-third of all
punitive damages awarded be payable to the state general fund when those
damages were "collected." Just as with § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Colorado statute,
C.R.S. § 13-21-102 (4) (1987), did not vest the State of Colorado with any interest
in the punitive damage judgment, but rather set forth that the state was entitled to
one-third of a final judgment (by definition already vested in the private plaintiff),
and then only if and when the "punitive damages," were "collected."3

The

Colorado statute read:
"One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this
section shall be paid into the state general fund. The remaining twothirds of such damages collected shall be paid to the injured party.
Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general
fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or in the
litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due."
C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (emphasis added).
The Colorado Supreme Court, in concluding that the Colorado statute
worked a "taking" of the plaintiffs constitutionally vested property rights in the

3

It is noteworthy that the Utah statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was enacted only two
years after the Colorado statute in Kirk.
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punitive damage judgment, began its analysis by stating that a vested interest in a
judgment of a court is a property right protected as any other property interest:
". . . The term 'property9 also includes the judgment itself, which
creates an independent legal right to full satisfaction from the 'goods
and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate of every person against
whom any judgment is obtained.5 . . . [S]ee generally, Evans v. City
of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1982) (final judgment no
longer subject to modification is vested property right); Truax-Traer
Coal Co. v. Compensation Cornm'r., 17 S.E.2d 330, 334 (W.Va.
1941) (judgment is 'property5 and as such is proper subject of
constitutional protection55).
818 P.2d at 267 (emphasis added).
The Kirk Court went on to hold that the punitive damage judgment was not
only indivisible and part of the compensatory damage judgment to which the State
of Colorado had no interest, but also the Colorado statute was a forced
contribution imposed not on the wrongdoer defendant, but rather upon the plaintiff
who suffered the wrongdoing:
"As we previously observed, while a judgment for exemplary
damages is designed to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar
conduct by others, it is only available when a civil wrong has been
committed under extremely aggravating circumstances and when the
injured party has a successful claim for actual damages against the
wrongdoer. Harding Glass Co., Inc., 640 P.2d at 1123 at 1126-27.
In that sense, an exemplary damages award is not totally devoid of
any and all reparative elements. More importantly, the forced
contribution of one-third of the exemplary damages judgment is
imposed not on the defendant wrongdoer who caused the Injuries but
upon the plaintiff who suffered the wrong. It goes without saying
that placing the burden of payment on the judgment creditor who
suffered the wrong bears no reasonable relationship to any arguable
goal of punishing the wrongdoer or deterring others from engaging
in similar conduct.55
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Id. at 270 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Utah agrees. Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 806 (Utah 1991) (compensatory and punitive
damages have nexus with respect to the egregiousness of the misconduct, the
impact upon the plaintiff, the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, and the
relationship between the parties (fiduciary in this case)).
Turning to the issue of constitutionally vested rights, the Colorado Supreme
Court cited the landmark case of McCullough, supra, as well as a string of other
cases in holding:
"Where a private property interest emanates from a final judgment,
the long-standing rule, announced by the Supreme Court in
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898), and
consistently followed by other courts, is that such a property interest
cannot be diminished by legislative fiat . . . [quoting McCullough
and other cases]. "
Id. at 268 (emphasis added). Concluding that the taking of a money judgment
from a vested judgment creditor is "substantially equivalent to the taking of money
itself (id. at 269), the Colorado Court struck down the Colorado statute as a
"taking" violative of the Colorado and Federal Constitutions:
"We thus conclude that section 13-21-102(4) constitutes a taking of
a judgment creditor's private property interest in an exemplary
damages award without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article II, section 15, of the Colorado Constitution."
Id. at 273.
The statute in Kirk is clearly comparable to § 78-18-1(3) (1989) because
the punitive "damages" in Kirk are synonymous with "award" in Utah, and the
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entitlement thereto is conditional upon being "collected" in Kirk and "paid" in
Utah. The State Treasurer attempts to distinguish the holding in Kirk on the basis
that the Colorado Court cited the phrase in the Colorado statute: "[njothing in
subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim
for exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment
becoming due." A fair reading of the Kirk decision, however, demonstrates that
the Treasurer's claim is meritless.

The Colorado Supreme Court reached its

conclusions in Kirk squarely on a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of
the "Taking Clauses" of the State and Federal Constitutions, quite independently
of the disclaimer in the last sentence of C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987). The focus
of the Kirk Court was the vesting and the time of the vesting of the plaintiff, Kirk,
in the punitive damage judgment, vis-a-vis the Colorado statute which entitled the
State to a third of all damages when and if collected. In the 7-page Kirk opinion,
the Colorado Supreme Court mentions the disclaimer sentence only in passing as
an "add-on" type statement for its already-reached conclusion that the plaintiff had
a constitutionally vested property interest in the punitive damage judgment. Id. at
267, 272. For convenience, a copy of the Kirk Opinion is annexed as Attachment
9.
The 1989 Utah Punitive Damage Statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) substantively
matches the 1987 Colorado statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) and makes the
Kirk decision highly persuasive as to the "taking" issue before this Court. Just as
the District Court below concluded, the Colorado Court in Kirk determined that it
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did not have to reach the constitutional Separation of Powers and Equal Protection
arguments because of its conclusion that the "Taking Clauses" rendered the
comparable Colorado statute unconstitutional.
II.

IN THE 2004 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
RADICALLY CHANGED § 78-18-1(3) (1989), WHICH MAY HAVE
REMOVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT UNDER THE
"TAKINGS" CLAUSE WHICH IS NOW BEFORE THE COURT.
In the 2004 session of the Utah Legislature, Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) was

amended to introduce new substantive provisions that demonstrably changed the
structure and vesting of the interest of the plaintiff obtaining a punitive damage
judgment, as well as providing for a new interest of the State Treasurer in said
judgment. The new statute, § 78-18-1(3) (2004), as well as a copy of the Enrolled
Bill, S.B. 201, are annexed to this Brief as Attachment 4. While the 2004 statute
is not retroactive or applicable to this case, it could not have been scripted better to
highlight the Legislature's recognition of the constitutional infirmities in § 78-181(3) (1989) before this Court. A side-by side comparison of the 1989 and 2004
statutes is illustrative:

§ 78-18-1(3) (1989)

§ 78-18-1(3) (2004)

"In any judgment where punitive
damages are awarded and paid, 50%
of the [net punitive damages] shall .
. . be remitted to the state treasurer
for deposit into the General Fund."
(Emphasis added.)

Amended.
repealed.
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The word "paid" is

"(a) In any case where punitive
damages are awarded, the judgment
shall provide that 50°/o of the [net
punitive damages] shall . . . be
remitted by the judgment debtor to
the state treasurer for deposit into
the General Fund."
(Emphasis
added.)

No similar provision.

No similar provision.

"(c) The state shall have
due a judgment creditor
judgment is satisfied, and
equal footing with the
creditor of the original
securing a recovery."

No similar provision.

all rights
until the
stand on
judgment
case in

"Unless
all
affected
parties,
including the state, expressly agree
otherwise or the application is
contrary to the terms of the
judgment, any payment on the
judgment by or on behalf of any
judgment debtor, whether voluntary
or by execution or otherwise, shall
be applied in the following order:
(i) compensatory damages, and any
applicable attorneys fees and costs;
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive
damages; and finally
(iii) the balance of the punitive
damages."

No similar provision.

As the Court can readily determine, there are fundamental, substantive
changes in the 2004 statute:
•

Under § 78-18-l(3)(a) (2004), every punitive damage judgment thereafter
entered in Utah "shall provide" that 50% of the net punitive damages, after
$20,000 and actual and reasonable attorney's fees and costs are deducted, is
to be remitted to the State Treasurer. Thus under the 2004 statute, the
26

Treasurer's interest is recognized in the judgment when it is entered, vis-avis the 1989 statute in which the Treasurer's entitlement arises only and if a
punitive damage "award" is actually "paid."
•

It is the punitive damage judgment debtor under the 2004 statute who must
pay the net 50% of the punitive damage judgment to the State Treasurer,
vis-a-vis the 1989 statute before the Court in which the burden and onus
rests upon the plaintiff judgment creditor after payment is received from the
judgment debtor;

•

The words "paid" and punitive damages "awarded" in the 1989 statute have
been repealed under § 78-18-l(3)(a) (2004), further attaching the vesting
time of the Treasurer's interest to the entry of the punitive damage
"judgment" vis-a-vis the payment of the award;

•

Under § 78-18-l(3)(c) (2004), the State Treasurer, totally unlike the 1989
statute, has full rights of a judgment creditor who can immediately execute
upon and enforce the punitive damage judgment until satisfied, and in so
doing "stands on equal footing with the judgment creditor" who secured the
punitive damage judgment.

Thus, under the 2004 version, the State

Treasurer has standing to pursue the judgment upon execution, and in
bankruptcy, if necessary, defend an appeal, and for settlement purposes
stands on equal footing with the punitive damage plaintiff. In the 1989
statute before the Court, the State Treasurer has no such standing;

27

•

Under the new § 78-18-l(3)(d) (2004), the State is listed as an "affected
party" whose agreement must be obtained if the payment of a judgment,
including punitive damages, is made in any way other than a priority of
compensable damages first, actual attorney's fees and costs, second, the
initial $20,000 of punitive damages third, and punitive damages fourth.
The Treasurer has no such rights under § 78-18-1(3) (1989), under which
the punitive damage judgment plaintiff and defendant may compromise or
even waive the punitive damage judgment.
The Treasurer argues that § 78-18-1(3) (2004) was a mere "clarification" of

the language in the 1989 statute and did not constitute a substantive change (State
Br. @ 13) while making the candid admission that "[a]mendments to statutes are
generally presumed to indicate a legislative intent to change existing legal rights."
State Br. @ 14. Contrary to the Treasurer's argument, the 2004 changes to § 7818-1(3) (1989) are not simply a stylistic or clarifying facelift. They constitute a
heart transplant, fundamentally changing the rights of the punitive damage
plaintiff in the final judgment, as well as providing for the first time rights of the
State Treasurer in that judgment. Section 78-18-1(3) (2004) draws a "bright-line"
under the constitutional flaws in § 78-18-1(3) (1989) in effect at the entry of the
June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment.
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III. THE ACT OF VESTING OF THE ENTIRE JUNE 29, 2001 PUNITIVE
DAMAGE JUDGMENT IN THE SMITHS MAY WELL SUBJECT
THEM TO FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY, UNDER THE
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, REGARDLESS
OF THE
TREASURER'S CLAIM.
Because the full June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment of $5,500,000 in
this case constitutionally vested in the Smiths as of that date, there is a major
concern that the U. S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("I.R.S.") will take the
position that the entire punitive damage judgment is taxable to the Smiths under
the alternative minimum tax (sometimes "AMT") even if § 78-18- 1(3) (1989) is
determined constitutional and a net $2,740,000 less actual attorneys5 fees and
costs, were to be remitted to the State Treasurer. While this certainly is not a
result to which the Smiths would admit, it is an issue that reflects upon and is a
real consequence of the vesting of the entire punitive damage judgment in the
Smiths. Moreover, it absolutely cuts against the State Treasurer's argument that
the final punitive damage judgment was divided upon entry on June 29, 2001 and
that the Smiths' property rights only vested in 50% of that judgment.
There can be no doubt that the I.R.S., supported by tax court decisions, has
assessed income tax liability based on the AMT upon taxpayers who have
recovered punitive damages on the portion paid to the state under state statute. In
Banatis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted on attorney's fees, 124 S.Ct. 1712 (2004) U.S. LEXIS 2384, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the U. S. Tax Court holding that
economic and punitive damage awards are includable in gross income of the
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taxpayer, under the AMT, including part of the punitive damages paid to the State
of Oregon to settle Oregon's claim under the state punitive damage statute.
The Tax Court had earlier held in Banatis v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo. LEXIS 4, ^ 9, that under the AMT, attorney's fees
paid under a 40% contingency fee agreement applicable to both compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as all of the punitive damages, including that part paid
to the State of Oregon, were includable within the taxpayer's gross income
without deduction. Id. at 20. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to
the contingent attorney's fees paid to the plaintiffs lawyers, but affirmed the tax
court as to the total punitive damages including that portion paid to the State of
Oregon. Banatis at 1093. After reviewing the policy of the Alternative Minimum
Tax Statute, the Ninth Circuit held:
"We affirm the judgment of the Tax Court that the economic and
punitive damage awards are includable in gross income and that the
alternative minimum tax was constitutionally applied in this case.
We reverse the judgment of the Tax Court as to the inclusion of
attorneys fees in the taxpayer's gross income."
Id. (emphasis added). The Banatis decision is before the U. S. Supreme Court on
certiorari regarding the Ninth Circuit's reversal as to attorney's fees against the
I.R.S.
In a noted tax news commentary published by Tax Analysts TM on July 18,
2003, Robert W. Wood, author of Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement
Payments, 2nd Ed. 1998 (2001 Supplement) wrote regarding the proposed 2003
Senate Bill, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 2003:
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A last-minute amendment to the Senate Bill, introduced by Senator
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, dealt with punitive damage awards and is
worth noting. The Hatch-Amendment indicated that even though
punitive damages are now always taxable to the recipient (and that
was made clear back in 1996), a plaintiff will not be taxable on any
punitive damages that must be paid to a State under a so-called
'split-award statute.' Many states require that in a civil action where
punitive damages are paid to a private party, the state automatically
gets a 50% cut. In such a state, this clarification makes clear that
even though the punitives received by the plaintiff will be taxable to
the plaintiff, those going to the state will not."
The Hatch proposed amendment never made it out of the Senate
Committee, much less was considered by the full Senate or the House of
Representatives. 2003, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, July 22, 20O3.
The Treasurer's Brief attempts to twist and distort this issue contending that
the Smiths argued to the District Court the "fairness" of the AMT treatment of a
punitive damage judgment, whereas "fairness" is irrelevant in considering the
constitutionality of § 78-18-1(3) (1989). State Br. @19. The Treasurer misses the
whole point: that the I.R.S. position, the Tax Court decisions, the Banatis
precedent, and the unsuccessful Hatch amendment all underscore the principle
that, as in this case, the plaintiffs' constitutional property rights vest in a punitive
damage judgment

and

the

consequences

of that

vesting

subject

the

plaintiff/taxpayer to tax liability on the full punitive damage judgment, even if a
net 50% of the punitive award is years later remitted to the State Treasurer.
Constitutionally, it is not a matter of fairness, but rather the pragmatic recognition
of the brutal reality of the Treasurer's erroneous argument in this case.

n

The issue is also relevant because if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld as
constitutional and the Smiths were required to pay ordinary income tax on the net
50% remitted to the Treasurer, the result would wipe out virtually all recovery by
the Smiths of any part of the punitive damage judgment, bestowing an absolute
windfall upon the Treasurer. Most importantly, such a result would emasculate
much of the legal policy underlying punitive damages in this State, including the
incentive of Smiths and other victims to seek redress for egregious wrongdoing.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 806-08 (Utah 1991). The constitutional policy of this
Court affirms and protects vested property rights; it does not destroy them.
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950); Purdy v. Attorney General
732 A.2d 442, 447 (R.I. 1999).
While legislative history is entirely silent on the subject, the State Treasurer
will acknowledge that the new 2004 change in the punitive damage statute, § 7818-1(3) (2004), was enacted as an attempt to avoid in the future subjecting the
punitive damage plaintiff to ordinary income tax liability on 100% of the judgment
by vesting the State in future punitive damage judgments in Utah. While the 2004
enactment has no application to 1989 statute, it is a further recognition that under
§ 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Smiths became constitutionally vested in 100% of the
punitive damage judgment herein.
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IV.

THE STATE TREASURER ERRONEOUSLY RELIES UPON
STATUTES OR CASES IN OTHER STATES WHICH ARE EITHER
INAPPOSITE OR DISTINGUISHED ON THEIR FACE.
In an attempt to shore up his flawed position, the State Treasurer provides a

string cite of cases, without analysis, from other states wherein so-called splitpunitive damage recovery statutes were reviewed. State Br. @ pp. 17-18. As
concluded by the District Court, the weight given to those cases and statutes
substantially depends on the similarity to the Utah statute § 78-18-1(3) (1989).
Apart from the Kirk decision, the cases cited are distinguishable, inapposite
because of statutory dissimilarity, and of no assistance to this Court in deciding the
constitutional issues in this appeal other than to highlight the divergence.
The Treasurer first cites Anderson v. State of Alaska, 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska
2003). In fact, there are two Alaska opinions one, of which the State Treasurer
cited to the lower court but not on appeal, being Evans v. State of Alaska, 56 P.3d
1046 (Alaska 2002). R. 5359. In both cases, the four sitting Justices of the Alaska
Supreme Court were evenly divided, with two Justices opining that the Alaska
statute was an unconstitutional "taking" and a violation of substantive due process.
As a result, the district court finding of constitutionality stood. However, two
Justices writing in Evans focused on the vesting of a property interest in the jury
verdict stating:
". . . [I]f the verdict includes no express finding that the state
deserved part of the money, there is no factual predicate that allows
the court to . . . divert half the plaintiffs award to the state.
Regardless of whether we conceptualize a verdict as vesting a
property interest in the plaintiff or leaving it in the defendant, then,
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an order awarding half the verdict to the state necessarily results in
an impermissible taking."
Evans, 56 P.3d at 1078. In both Evans and Anderson, the two Justices who opined
that the Alaska statute was constitutional failed to even discuss the constitutionally
vested property rights that arise in a final judgment or a verdict.
The Treasurer also cites to DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Ore.
2002). DeMendoza is inapposite for the reason that the Oregon statute, like the
new 2004 Utah statute, § 78-18-l-(3) (2004), provides that the State of Oregon
"shall become a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages" and that the
judgment shall identify the State as a judgment creditor. Id. at 1235; see, O.R.S. §
18.540. Consequently, unlike § 78-18-1(3) (1989), a final judgment for punitive
damages in the State of Oregon did not 100% vest in the plaintiff. The Oregon
Supreme Court, in DeMendoza, emphasized the importance of a final judgment:
"We note that cases in other jurisdictions agree that a party has no
vested property right in a claim for punitive damages until judgment
is entered."
Id. at 1246 n. 14 (emphasis added).
In Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Missouri, 947 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.
1997), also cited, the plaintiff did not raise and the Missouri Court did not address
a constitutional "takings" challenge under the state or federal Constitutions. The
plaintiff apparently did raise a Separation of Powers argument, but the Court's
analysis is superficial and contains no discussion regarding the vested rights in
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final judgments, completely ignoring the substantial case law developed in the
path of McCullough v. Virginia, supra at 430-31.
Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003) is equally unavailing to the
Treasurer.

In Cheatham, the Indiana Court ruled, expressly, that the Indiana

statute was materially different from the Colorado (and thus the Utah) statute in
Kirk and distinguished Kirk on that basis. Id. at 474-75. The Indiana court failed
to even raise the question of the constitutionally vested property right in a final
judgment. Neither did Cheatham discuss the constitutional Separation of Powers
question.
The Treasurer further relies upon State of Georgia v. Moseley, et al., 436
S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993). Moseley is only important to demonstrate, like other
cases, how distinguished it is from this case. In a one-page opinion, the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed the Georgia punitive damage statute only in the context
of a claim by Moseley that the statute denied the punitive damage plaintiff the
right of trial by jury and "access to the courts." The Georgia court said it did
neither.
Moseley is hardly enlightening in this case. The Smiths have not argued
and do not argue that the common law of Utah regarding punitive damages may
not be changed without violating the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and
open access to the courts. What the Smiths do contend is that if the Legislature is
to change the law, it must do it in a way and manner that does not result in the
"taking55 of Smiths5 vested rights in a final judgment, does not diminish, degrade,
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or abrogate a final judgment of the Judicial Branch, and does not deny the Smiths
the equal protection of the law. As it was, the Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-125.1(e)(2) provided that upon issuance of a punitive damage judgment, the State of
Georgia would have "all rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is
satisfied and such judgment shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff of the
original case in securing a recovery. . . ." This language appears to have been
lifted and imported into the language of the new 2004 Utah statute, § 78-18l(3)(c).
Two other cases relied upon by the Treasurer, Gordon v. State of Florida,
608 So.2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1992) and Shepard Components, Inc. v. Brice
Petrides-Donohue and Assoc, 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa

1991), hold,

unremarkably, that the plaintiff has no vested right to a punitive damage award
prior to the entry of a judgment.

Neither Gordon nor Shepard Components

involved statutes similar to Utah or Colorado and neither addressed the
constitutional "taking" and Separation of Powers issues that adhere to a vested
right in a final judgment that is before this Court. Moreover, the Florida statute in
Gordon was repealed by the Florida legislature in 1997. Fla. Stat. § 768-73(2)(b).
New York also repealed its punitive damage statute, the Kansas statute expired,
and the Colorado statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-102 (4), repealed in 1995, had already
been declared unconstitutional under the Kirk decision in 1991.
Thus, the cases and statutes cited by the State Treasurer in his Brief are not
helpful to his position. Because of the similarity of § 78-18-1(3) (1989) to the
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Colorado statute struck down in Kirk and that decision's substantial analysis of the
"takings" issue, the Kirk decision is singularly the most persuasive authority
before this Court on the constitutional "taking" question.
V.

SECTION 78-18-1(3) (1989), VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES V AND VIII OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROHIBIT THE LEGISLATURE FROM
INTERFERING WITH OR IMPAIRING THE INTEGRITY OF A
FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH.
The District Court, in holding that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) constituted a

prohibited "taking" in violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions, did
not reach Smiths5 further claim that the statute also violates the constitutional
Separation of Powers Article under the Judicial Article.

The conclusion is

inescapable that § 78-18-1(3) does violate the separation of powers doctrine,
perhaps the most fundamental principle of the Utah Constitution.
1. The Separation of Powers Doctrine.
The Utah Constitution provides for a separation of the three branches of
government in Article V, Section 1:
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and
the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expressly directed or permitted."
(Emphasis added). Article V also "prohibits the legislative branch or the executive
branch from taking over judicial functions." In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633,
642 (Utah 1988). The judicial powers of the courts, as set forth in Article VIII, is vested:
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"in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme
Court, in district courts, in justices of the peace, and such other
courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law."
Art. VIII, sec. 1. The judicial power of the district courts is set forth in Article VIII,
section 7:
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law. . .
The District Courts or any judge thereof, shall have power . . . necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees .. ."
The 'judicial power of courts,5 "is generally understood to be the power to hear
and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation."
Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water
Conservancy District 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984), quoting Citizens Club v.
Welling, 27 P.2d, 23 (1933).
Utah courts have long recognized the danger of legislative intrusion into
judicial functions. In the early case In re Handley's Estate, 49 P. 829 (Utah 1897),
this Court addressed the separation of powers in reviewing a statute affecting final
judgments. The Court explained the purpose behind the separation of powers
doctrine:
"The purpose of separating and classifying the powers of
government, and of intrusting the lawmaking power to the officers of
one department and the right to execute laws to another, and the
power to interpret and construe and apply laws to the conduct and
contentions of mankind to another, was to prevent the evils that
would arise if all were concentrated and held by the same hand.
Such a concentration of power would give to the class of officers
possessing it absolute power and that would amount to a despotism."
Id. at 830. The law at issue in Handley's Estate allowed heirs to reopen final
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probate judgments.

The Court held that the law constituted a legislative

usurpation of judicial authority and thus violated the separation of powers:
"If we were to affirm the validity of the law in question, we would,
in effect, say that the legislature may exercise judicial powers,
authorize and require the courts to set aside final judgments and
decrees, divest titles, and destroy and annihilate vested rights. The
people of the state have not intrusted such powers to the legislature."
Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
This Court has more recently rejected, under the Separation of Powers
doctrine, attempts by the legislature to wield judicial power. See ej*. Salt Lake
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) (holding unconstitutional a statute
by which the legislature attempted to vest judicial power in persons not duly
appointed as Article VIII judges). "Core judicial functions necessarily include all
powers that are 'necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch5 and, as such, may not be delegated to persons other than judicial officers."
Id. at 849 (citations omitted). Such knowledgeable core judicial functions include
"the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order." Id.
2.

The Controlling Precedent of the Constitutional
Separation of Powers Doctrine Precludes the State
Treasurer's Appeal.

The Separation of Powers doctrine in the Utah Constitution is modeled
upon Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution of the United States. fl[T]he central
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution [was] that, within our political
scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is
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essential to the preservation of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
380(1989). 4
The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the relationship
between the judiciary and the legislature in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409
(1792). At issue was a federal statute providing that the courts would determine
whether a war veteran was entitled to a pension and the amount thereof, and that
the Secretary of War was to review the court decision and transmit his opinion to
Congress for its approval. Although the case was dismissed as moot, the Justices'
views regarding the constitutionality of the statute were noted. The Justices and
judges of three circuit courts refused to entertain the applications under the
statutory scheme, the New York panel stating:
"[The Act] subjects the decisions of these courts . . . first to the
consideration and suspension of the secretary of war, and then to the
revision of the legislature; whereas, by the constitution, neither the
secretary of war, nor any other executive officer, nor even the
legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial
acts or opinions of this court."
Id. at 412. The justices from Pennsylvania jointly mailed a letter to President
Washington declaring that "[n]o decision of any court of the United States can,

4

Where provisions of the Utah State Constitution and the United States
Constitution are similar, this Court looks to federal case law for guidance in
interpreting the state constitutional provision. Rg. West Gallery Corporation v.
Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 586 P.2d 429 (Utah 1978) (federal case
law concerning free speech guarantees relied on in interpreting state constitutional
provision); Terra Utilities, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 575 P.2d 1029, 1033
(Utah 1978) (due process decisions of the U.S. Constitution "are highly persuasive
as to the application of that [due process] clause of our state Constitution").
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under any circumstances . . . be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the
legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested." Id.
The fundamental and founding principle that decisions of the judiciary
cannot be revised or altered by the legislature has been restated aad affirmed on
numerous occasions. See McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24; Johnston. 14 F.3d at
490-91. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated this crucial rule in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.. 514 U.S. 211 (1995):
"The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of
the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives
the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to
decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article
III hierarchy—with an understanding, in short, that 'a judgment
conclusively resolves the case' because 'a "judicial Power" is one to
render dispositive judgments.5"
Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added), citing Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990).
Under the Separation of Powers doctrine, the legislature is prohibited from
interfering in or revising the final judgment of a court of this State:
"In cases involving the Congress and the federal judiciary, the vested
rights doctrine . . . has a separation of powers component which
prevents Congress from sitting as a 'court of errors' with the power
to suspend or revise final judgments of the federal courts."
Johnston, 14 F.3d at 491 (emphasis added). "It is not within the power of the
legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment."
McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24; see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855).
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In addition to Hayburn's Case, the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. 641 (1874) soundly rejected the United States 5 attempt
to revise the terms a final judgment by way of legislation in existence at the time
of the judgment. Therein, the United States, in paying on a final judgment owed
to plaintiff, attempted to deduct from the judgment a tax allegedly owed by the
plaintiff to the United States. The Supreme Court found that the United States
failed to raise a counterclaim for the tax and had no legal basis to alter the final
judgment:
"Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a
cause, and inasmuch as the [United States] Constitution does not
contemplate that there shall be more than one Supreme Court, it is
quite clear that Congress cannot subject the judgments of the
Supreme Court to the reexamination and revision of any other
tribunal or any other department of government."
Id. at 647-48.
3.

The State Treasurer Misapprehends the Nature and Magnitude
of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

The Treasurer claims that § 78-18-1(3) does not violate the constitutional
separation of powers because "[ojnce the punitive damages were defined by
statute, that is the sum that the Smiths or others similarly situated could expect to
recover under any judgment where punitive damages are awarded." State Br. @
17. There are fatal defects in the Treasurer's argument. First, the District Court's
June 29, 2001 judgment plainly and articulately states that the Smiths, and only
the Smiths, have a vested interest in the compensatory and punitive damage
judgment. Second is the equally obvious problem that the Treasurer is not named
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anywhere in the Judgment even as an interested party, much less a judgment
creditor. Third, the Smiths were aware of the statute as well as the likelihood of
its unconstitutionality. The Treasurer never intervened to claim a vested interest.
As a result, the final judgment constitutionally vested in the Smiths on June 29,
2001, which judgment was thereafter reviewed and affirmed by this Court. The
final judgment is now unequivocally beyond rewrite or revision that would alter its
plain terms or attempt to divest, dilute, or deprive the Smiths of their constitutional
rights and property interests.
The fact that the statute existed at the time of the judgment is irrelevant
because, as earlier stated, it does not vest in the Treasurer any interest in the final
judgment but only conditionally or hypothetically upon payment of the punitive
award by the judgment debtor to the judgment plaintiff.
If the State Treasurer is successful in his argument herein, then no final
judgment of this Court will be secure from legislative invasion and revision. The
law set forth in Hayburn's Case, O'Grady, and two-hundred and fifty years of
Separation of Powers jurisprudence plainly forecloses that possibility.
VI.

THE STATUTE, § 78-18-1(3) (1989), VIOLATES THE SMITHS'
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW ESTABLISHED BY
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH
STATE CONSTITUTION.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that

all persons "similarly situated" will be treated similarly. City of Cleburne, Tex, v.
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Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

The Utah Constitution

provides at Article 1, Sec. 24:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Although the language of the Utah Clause is different from the Fourteenth
Amendment, "these provisions embody the same general principle: persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons

in

different

circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same."
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).
In point of law, Utah courts may construe the Equal Protection Clause in
the Utah Constitution even more broadly than its Federal counterpart:
"Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution
incorporates the same general fundamental principles as are
incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our construction and
application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal courts'
construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case
law developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive
in applying Article I, § 24, but that law is not binding so long as we
do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 670 (case citations omitted).
Under Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution: "a two-part test is necessary
to ensure the uniform operation of the laws: 'first, a law must apply equally to all
persons within a class.

Second, the statutory classifications and the different

treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute."

Condemarin v. University

Hospital 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989), quoting Malan v. Lewis.
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Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) violates the Equal Protection guarantees of both
the Federal and State Constitutions.

First, the statute discriminates between

similarly situated persons by taking 50% of punitive damage awards but leaving
untouched statutory punitive damage awards. Second, the statute discriminates
against similarly situated persons by taking 50% of punitive damage awards but
not taking punitive damages obtained by settlement.
1.

Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Touch Statutory Punitive
Damages That are Punitive in Nature.

The statute fails to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clauses as it
does not apply to plaintiffs who recover statutory punitive damage awards of
double or treble damages, even though such punitive awards are equally intended
as punishment for improper behavior. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609
F.2d 873, 888 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980). For instance:
•

The Utah Antitrust Act provides for an award of "three times the amount of
damages sustained." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919(l)(b).

•

The Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (formerly the RICE statute),
provides for an award of "twice the damages" sustained. Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1605(1).

•

The issuer of a bad check may be liable for triple the check amount. Utah
Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(b)(vi)(A)(II).

•

Treble damages are awarded in successful forcible entry and detainer cases.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3).

•

In an action for waste, "there may be a judgment for treble damages." Utah
Code Ann. §78-38-2.
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Numerous such examples exist under Federal statutes as well. For instance, The
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
1203(c)(4), the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), and RICO, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a),
each provide for treble damages.
A simple example demonstrates that Section 78-18-1(3) violates the
Smiths' guarantees to Equal Protection.

Plaintiff brings a lawsuit against

defendant for price fixing under the Utah antitrust laws, for breach of fiduciary
duty and for common law fraud. The jury finds liability on all three counts and
awards $1 million compensatory damages, and also awards punitive damages of
$3 million for the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud counts. By
statute, plaintiff would also receive $3 million treble exemplary damages under the
Antitrust Statute.

Under the Treasurer's theory of this case, would he claim

entitlement to 50% of the $3 million treble damages award for the antitrust
violation under § 78-18-1(3) (1989) as he would claim 50% of the punitive
damages award on the breach of fiduciary duty and fraud counts, when paid? The
Treasurer has stated that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was not intended to reach statutory
punitive damages. R. 5362. That being the case, the Equal Protection violation is
clear. There is no rational basis for the Utah Legislature's attempt to take 50% of
punitive damages under § 78-18-1(3) (1989) but not 50% of other punitive
damages awarded under punitive statutes.
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2.

The Statute S 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Reach Punitive Damages
Obtained by Settlement

The statute applies by its terms to punitive damages which are "awarded
and paid."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(3)(l) (1989) (emphasis added).

Its

operation thus applies to litigants who obtain punitive damages by trial but not to
litigants who receive payment of punitive damages claim by settlement.

The

distinction is without rationale.
If litigants who succeed in recovering punitive damage payments are to be
penalized by the State taking one-half, there is no rational basis for distinguishing
between the methods by which such damages are obtained and paid. The effect
punishes litigants who properly invoke their rights to the open courts of Utah and
prevail against a defendant who has acted willfully, maliciously, or with wanton
disregard of the rights of plaintiff.
VII.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE ONLY, IF THIS COURT UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 78-18-1(3) (1989), THE SMITHS ARE
NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO ALL INTEREST ON THE
PUNITIVE DAMGE JUDGMENT WHICH VESTED ON JUNE 29,
2001.
If this Court affirms the District Court, it will be unnecessary to address

this question.

However, were this Court to reverse and uphold § 78-18-1(3)

(1989), interest on the punitive judgment which accrued from the date of judgment
through the date of payment is vested in and owed to the Smiths.
Price Development was required to pay statutory interest on the entire
punitive damage judgment from the date of its entry on June 29, 2001 to the date
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of payment. Even if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were assumed to be constitutional, the
best argument which the State Treasurer could make in that event would be an
entitlement to a net 50% of the punitive damage award, but not until and only if
the "award" is paid. In other words, the Treasurer's entitlement starts to run only
when there is a payment of the award by Price Development to the Smiths, not
when the judgment was entered. It is only the Smiths who are vested in the
punitive damage judgment and it is only that judgment, not the punitive damage
award, which carries statutory interest. Assuming, arguendo, § 78-18-1(3) (1989)
is constitutional, the Legislature did not specify that the Treasurer would be
entitled to statutory interest on the punitive damage award. It could have and has
done so when that was the legislative intent. E.g. Utah Eminent Domain Code, §
78-34-9(5)(c) (the judgment "shall include, as part of the just compensation
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum . ..").
Interest payable on the judgment under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) is
vested in and payable only to the Smiths, regardless of the Treasurer's claim of
entitlement to a net 50% of the punitive damage award when it was triggered by
payment three years later.

The failure of the Treasurer to be vested in the

judgment deprives him, as a matter of law, of the $560,020 interest accrued on the
judgment while the Smiths were enforcing and defending the same against Price
Development.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should affirm the decision of the
District Court that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) violates the "takings55 prohibitions in the
Utah and United States Constitutions. The statute further violates the Separation
of Powers established in the Utah Constitution, and Equal Protection guarantees of
the State and Federal Charters. In the alternative only, if the statute is upheld to be
constitutional, the Smiths are entitled to the full amount of interest on the June 29,
2001 judgment
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL
JENNIFER A. WHITLOCK
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 S. Main Street, 16th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees.
December 14, 2004.
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CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Section
78-18-1.

Section
78-18-2.

Basis for punitive damages
awards — Section inapplicable
to DUI cases — Division of
award with state.

Drug exception.

78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award
with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol
and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15
or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into
the General Fund.
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 237, § 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4.
punitive damages that arise on or after May 1,
1989.

Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4
provides that the act applies to all claims for
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Evidence admissible.
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Tab 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896

Tab 3

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment V - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Tab 4

CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of
award with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general
damages are awarded and it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any
claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section
41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or
78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior
award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall
be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive
damages has been made.
(3) (a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded,
the judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of the
punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an
allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and
costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and
costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding
attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor.
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment
creditor until the judgment is satisfied, and stand on
equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original
case in securing a recovery.
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state,
expressly agree otherwise or the application is contrary to
the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment
by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary
or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the
following order:
(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs;
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and finally
(iii) the balance of the punitive dam a crpa
—
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S.B. 201
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AMENDMENTS
2004 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard
LONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill makes changes concerning the division of punitive damage awards with the
state.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
•

requires that the state's portion of a punitive damage award be paid directly to the

state by the judgment debtor;
• puts the state on the same footing as another judgment creditor when collecting
punitive damages; and
• prescribes a priority and order for the payment of punitive damages.
Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
78-18-1, as last amended by Chapters 200 and 314, Laws of Utah 2002

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 78-18-1 is amended to read:
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards - Section inapplicable to DUI cases
— Division of award with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only

S.B. 201

Enrolled Copy

if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a)
do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor
vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is
not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection (l)(a)
whether or not restitution has been paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action
under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a
finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) (a) In any [judgment] case where punitive damages are awarded [and paid], the
judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000
shall, after an allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted by the
judgment debtor to the statetreasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
incurred by the judgment creditor[;] minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding
attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor.
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until the judgment is satisfied,
and stand on equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original case in securing a recovery.
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, expressly agree otherwise or the
application is contrary to the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment by or on behalf
of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the
following order:
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(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs;
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and finally
fiii) the balance of the punitive damages.
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Tab 5

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Section 1. [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of
the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
1896

Tab 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Tab 7

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court,
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by
Statute.

1984 (2nd S.S.)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. Judges of other
courts of record shall be at least 25 years old, United States
citizens, Utah residents for three years preceding selection,
and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions
are provided for any court, judges of that court shall reside in
the geographic division for which they are selected.
1984 (2nd S.S.)

Tab 8

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment XIV - Citizenship rights. Ratified 7/9/1868.
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and VicePresident, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
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was that the additional wells issue was
common to several actions, including the
yet uncompleted actions.13 This common
issue makes consolidated appellate review
especially suitable. Interim appellate review creates the possibility of duplicative
appellate review of this issue. Moreover,
we see no urgent reason for immediate,
separate appellate review. The presumption of nonappealability has not been overcome. Under these facts, we are persuaded that the judgments appealed from
cannot be considered final in absence of a
Rule 54(b) certification. We therefore dismiss the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

damages, but otherwise affirmed. On remand, the District Court, John W Coughlin, J., awarded exemplary damages, but
denied distributor's motion challenging constitutionality of statutory requirement that
he pay one third of all such damages into
state general fund. Distributor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Quinn, J., held that
statute requiring party receiving exemplary damages award to pay one third of such
award into state general fund effected an
unconstitutional taking of private property
without just compensation.
Reversed and remanded.
Rovira, C.J., filed dissenting opinion in
which Lohr, J., joined.

Appeals dismissed.

Dewayne C. KIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The DENVER PUBLISHING COMPANY, a Colorado corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 88SA405.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Sept. 23, 1991.
Newspaper publisher sued its distributor for balance allegedly owed. Distributor counterclaimed for outrageous conduct
and willful and wanton breach of contract.
The District Court, City and County of
Denver, Robert T. Kingsley, J., granted
distributor's motion for directed verdict on
publisher's claim for monies due on open
account, directed verdict against distributor
on his counterclaim for outrageous conduct
and entered judgment for distributor on his
claim for willful and wanton breach of contract. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
729 P.2d 1004, remanded for new trial on
13. See supra note 6.

1. Constitutional Law <s=>277(l)
Judgment for exemplary damages qualifies as property interest subject to constitutional protection.
West's C.R.S.A.
§§ 13-21-102(4), 13-52-102(1); U.S.C.A.
ConstAmends. 5, 14; West's C.R.S.A.
Const. Art. 2, § 15.
2. Constitutional Law <3=>278(1)
Private property interest emanating directly from final judgment cannot be diminished by legislative fiat. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14; West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art.
2. § 15.
3. Eminent Domain <e=>2(l.l)
To withstand constitutional challenge
to governmental appropriation of significant part of money judgment under taking
clause of United States Constitution, governmental appropriation must bear reasonable relationship to governmental services
provided to civil litigants in making use of
judicial process for purpose of resolving
civil claim resulting in the judgment.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
4. Eminent Domain <§=>2(1.1)
Statute requiring party receiving exemplary damages award to pay one third of
such award into state general fund effected an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation.
West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4); U.S.C.A.
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ConstAmends. 5, 14;
Const. Art 2, § 15,

West's C.R.S.A.

withstand even rational-basis standard of
review under equal protection analysis.
West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4); U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.

5. Damages <s=»87(l)
Statute requiring party receiving exemplary damages award to pay one third of 9. Licenses G=>29
such award into state general fund did not
Valid user fee need not be designed
qualify as valid penalty or forfeiture; plac- with mathematical precision to defray cost
ing burden of payment on judgment credi- of service for which fee is imposed, but
tor who suffered wrong bore no reasonable must bear reasonable relationship to overrelationship to any arguable goal of punish- all cost of that service.
ing wrongdoer or deterring others from
10. Damages <s=*87(l)
engaging in similar conduct. West's
Statute requiring party receiving exC.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4).
emplary damages award to pay one third of
such award into state general fund failed
6. Taxation <s=»73
to
qualify as valid user fee; statute exactStatute requiring party receiving exed
a forced contribution in order to provide
emplary damages award to pay one third
into state general fund did not satisfy crite- general governmental revenues and did so
ria for ad valorem property tax; statute in a manner and to a degree not reasonably
was designed to raise revenues for state related to costs of using the courts.
general fund, but was limited only to per- West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4).
sonal property in form of judgment for 11. Constitutional Law ®=>55
exemplary damages and had no applicabiliLegislature may well abate or diminish
ty at all to any other form of private proppending civil action, but when that claim
erty, real or personal. West's C.R.S.A.
ripens into judgment, power of legislature
§ 13-21-102(4).
to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.
7. Taxation <s=*40(l)
Where obvious purpose of statute is to
produce revenue for state general fund,
Pryor, Carney and Johnson, P.C., W.
statute must conform to state constitution- Randolph Barnhart, Arlene V. Dykstra,
al requirement that all taxes upon each of Thomas L. Roberts, Richard V. Hess, Enthe various classes of real and personal glewood, for plaintiff-appellant.
property be "uniform" and be levied under
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T.
general laws prescribing such regulations
Slaughter,
Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timoas shall secure just and equal valuations of
thy
M.
Tymkovich,
Sol. Gen., Dianne Eret,
all property, whether real or personal.
First
Asst.
Atty.
Gen.,
Denver, for amicus
West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3; West's
curiae
State
of
Colo.
C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4).
8. Constitutional Law <s=*229(l)
Justice QUINN delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Damages @=>87(1)
Taxation <3=>40(6)
This case involves a challenge to the
Statute requiring party receiving ex- constitutionality of section 13-21-102(4),
emplary damages award to pay one third 6A C.R.S. (1987), which was enacted in
into state general fund did not qualify as 1986 as part of tort-reform legislation and
valid excise tax; excise tax imposed on requires a party receiving an exemplary
limited class of persons exercising their damages award to pay one-third of all such
rights to use courts, while other persons "damages collected . . . into the state genexercising same right were not subject to eral fund." l DeWayne C. Kirk filed a tort
tax, would be so underinclusive as not to claim against Denver Publishing Company,
1. Appellate jurisdiction over this appeal lies in
this court because the constitutionality of a stat-

ute is challenged,
(1987).

§ 13-4-102(l)(b), 6A C.R.S.
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doing business as The Rocky Mountain
News, and was awarded a judgment for
exemplary damages in the amount of $118,980. In a post-trial motion Kirk unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the
one-third payment requirement and thereafter filed this appeal. We conclude that
section 13-21-102(4) effectuates a forced
taking of the judgment creditor's property
interest in the judgment and does so in a
manner and to a degree unrelated to any
constitutionally permissible governmental
interest served by the taking and, therefore, violates the federal and state constitutional proscriptions against the taking of
private property without just compensation. U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Colo,
Const, art. II, § 15. We accordingly reverse that part of the judgment upholding
the constitutionality of section 13-21102(4), and we remand the case to the district court with directions to conform its
judgment to the views herein expressed,

Although this case has a lengthy procedural history, the basic facts can be briefly
stated. Kirk, who owned and operated an
independent newspaper distributorship,
purchased newspapers from The Rocky
Mountain News and resold them to newspaper carriers, stores, and to the public
through newspaper racks. In November
1979, Kirk terminated his relationship with
Denver Publishing Company, but withheld
payment for part of his September and all
of his October billings in order to achieve
leverage in his final accounting with Denver Publishing Company.
Because Kirk and the company were unable to settle a final accounting, Denver
Publishing Company sued Kirk for the balance allegedly owed by him. Kirk counterclaimed for outrageous conduct and willful
and wanton breach of contract. In the
first trial, the court granted Kirk's motion
for a directed verdict on Denver Publishing
2. The statutory scheme for exemplary damages
provides that an exemplary damages award
must not exceed the amount of actual damages
unless exceptional circumstances not present
here justify an increase. §§ 13-21-102(l)(a) &
13-21-102(3), 6A C.R.S. (1987). Kirk and Den-

Company's claim for monies due on open
account, directed a verdict against Kirk on
his counterclaim for outrageous conduct,
and entered a judgment of $910.26 for Kirk
on the jury's verdict returned in his favor
on his claim for willful and wanton breach
of contract. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's directed verdicts on Denver
Publishing Company's open account claim
and Kirk's counterclaim for outrageous
conduct, and also affirmed the judgment of
liability on Kirk's counterclaim against
Denver Publishing Company for willful and
wanton breach of contract, but remanded
the case for a new trial "on the issues of
actual damages, damages for emotional distress, and exemplary damages" on Kirk's
contractual claim. Denver Publishing Co.
v. Kirk, 729 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Colo.App.
1986).
U p o n r e m a n d o f t h e c a s e f o r a n e w trial>

Kirk was realigned as the plaintiff and was
permitted to add a claim for malicious prosecution. The case was retried in 1988, and
the jury awarded Kirk compensatory damages in the aggregate amount of $288,000
and exemplary damages in the amount of
$160,500 on Kirk's claim for malicious prosecution. The exemplary damages award,
at the request of Kirk, was subsequently
reduced to $118,980 so as not to exceed the
amount of actual damages on Kirk's claim
for malicious prosecution.2 After the jury
verdict, Kirk filed a post-trial motion in
which he requested the district court to
invalidate, as violative of several provisions
of both the United States and Colorado
Constitutions, the statutory requirement of
section 13-21-102(4) that he pay one-third
of an
y collected exemplary damages award
to the state
general fund. The district
court denied the
motion,
Kirk thereafter filed this appeal and invokes several federal and state constitutional provisions in challenging the onethird payment requirement of section 1321-102(4). Denver Publishing Company
ver Publishing Company stipulated that the malicious prosecution claim, on which the exemplary damages award was based, arose subsequent to the effective date of the 1986 statutory
scheme.
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takes no position on the constitutionality of
the statute. The Attorney General, however, has intervened as amicus and has
filed a brief in support of the district
court's declaration of constitutionality. We
find it unnecessary to address all of Kirk's
claims, as we conclude that the mandatory
one-third payment requirement of section
13-21-102(4) violates the Taking Clause of
the United States and Colorado Constitutions.3 Our conclusion derives from the
nature of an exemplary damages award as
a private property right, the confiscatory
character of the "taking" mandated by the
statute, and the manifest absence of a reasonable nexus between the statutory taking of one-third of the exemplary damages
award and the cost of any governmental
services that arguably might support a significantly smaller forced contribution.

ture, Seaward Construction Co., Inc. v.
Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 974 (Colo.1991),
Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768,
770 (Colo. 1980); Mince v. Butters, 200
Colo. 501, 503, 616 P.2d 127, 129 (1980).
This is not to say that these two remedies
are totally unrelated to and independent of
each other. We implicitly recognized the
interrelationship between compensatory
and exemplary damages in Palmer v. A.E
Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 213-14
(Colo. 1984), where we observed that a claim
for exemplary damages is not "a separate
and distinct cause of action," but rather "is
auxiliary to an underlying claim for actual
damages" and thus can be entered only in
conjunction with an underlying and successful claim for actual damages assessed
against a wrongdoer for a legal wrong to
the injured party. So also, a claim for
exemplary damages contemplates "tortious
conduct," Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. PodleII.
ski, 742 P.2d 900, 902 (Colo.1987), and in
We begin our analysis by examining the that respect, requires, as does a claim for
nature of an award for exemplary dam- compensatory damages, some measure of
legal fault. See Harding Glass Co., Inc. v.
ages.
Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1126-27 (Colo.1982).
Thus, while a compensatory damages
award serves the reparative function of
making
the injured party whole, it also
Tort law generally provides for two
types of monetary remedies for a civil performs the secondary function of diswrong. Compensatory damages are in- couraging "a repetition of [the defendant's]
tended to "make [the plaintiff] whole," wrongful conduct" by serving as a "warnBullerdick v. Pritchard, 90 Colo. 272, 275, ing to others who are inclined to commit
8 P.2d 705, 706 (1932), while exemplary similar wrongs." C. Morris, Punitive
damages are intended to punish the wrong- Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev.
doer and deter similar conduct in the fu- 1173, 1174 (1931).4 In a somewhat similar
3.

Kirk raises the following constitutional claims
which we find it unnecessary to address: that
section 13-21-102(4) violates procedural and
substantive due process of law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States
and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const, amend.
XIV; Colo. Const, art. II, § 25; that the statute
was enacted in contravention of the General
Assembly's revenue-raising authority conferred
by article X of the Colorado Constitution; that
the statute impairs the obligation of Kirk's contingency-fee contract with his attorney in violation of the constitutional proscription against
the impairment of contracts under the United
States and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const,
art. I, § 10; Colo. Const, art. II, § 11; and that
the statutory taking authorized by section 1321-102(4) contravenes the separation-of-powers
doctrine set forth in article III of the Colorado
Constitution.

4. This interrelationship between the reparative
and admonitory functions served by compensatory damages has been explained as follows:
The large portion of our tort law in which
liability is dependent on fault can only be
used to compensate plaintiffs when there are
defendants deserving of punishment. As long
as the liability with fault rules are retained,
the law of torts will have an admonitory function even though the doctrine of punitive
damages is abandoned. So punishment in
tort actions is not anomalous (if anomalous
only means unusual); and punitive damage
practice is only one of many means of varying
the size of money judgments in view of the
admonitory function. The function itself is
inherent in the liability with fault rules, and is
not dependent on the allowance of punitive
damages. Punitive damages are ordinarily
merely a means of increasing the severity of
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fashion, a claim for exemplary damages,
while clearly designed to punish and deter,
contemplates that the trier of fact will fix
the award only after giving due consideration to the severity of the injury perpetrated on the injured party by the wrongdoer.

awarded to the injured party." § 13-21102(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987). In keeping
with the somewhat interrelated functions
served by both compensatory and exemplary damages, however, the statutory scheme
permits a court to increase an award of
exemplary damages to a sum not to exceed
B.
three times the amount of actual damages
if
it is shown that the defendant during the
In 1986, as part of tort-reform legislapendency
of the action has continued the
tion, the General Assembly modified the
injurious
behavior
against the plaintiff or
preexisting statutory scheme for exemplaothers
in
a
willful
and wanton manner or
ry damages. Chap. 106, sec. 1, § 13-21has
willfully
and
wantonly
further aggra102, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 675-76. Section
13-21-102(l)(a), which substantially follows vated the damages to the plaintiff when
the initial Colorado exemplary damages the defendant knew or should have known
statute enacted in 1889,5 see 1889 Colo. that such action would produce aggravation. § 13-21-102(3)(a) & (b), 6A C.R.S.
Sess.Laws 64-65, states as follows:
6
In all civil actions in which damages are (1987).
assessed by a jury for a wrong done to
The focal point of this case is section 13the person or to personal or real proper- 21-102(4), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which states:
ty, and the injury complained of is atOne-third of all reasonable damages coltended by circumstances of fraud, mallected pursuant to this section shall be
ice, or willful and wanton conduct, the
paid into the state general fund. The
jury, in addition to the actual damages
remaining two-thirds of such damages
sustained by such party, may award him
collected shall be paid to the injured parreasonable exemplary damages.
ty. Nothing in this subsection (4) shall
The term "willful and wanton conduct" is
be construed to give the general fund
defined as conduct "purposefully commitany interest in the claim for exemplary
ted which the actor must have realized as
damages or in the litigation itself at any
dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly,
time prior to payment becoming due.
without regard to consequences, or of the By its plain terms, section 13-21-102(4)
rights and safety of others, particularly the contemplates the entry, and the actual colplaintiff." § 13-21-102(l)(b), 6A C.R.S. lection, of a final judgment on behalf of the
(1987). The 1986 statute states that the injured party, for it is only after the injured
amount of reasonable exemplary damages party has invested the time, effort, and
"shall not exceed an amount which is equal expense of obtaining and actually collecting
to the amount of the actual damages the judgment that the statutory grant of
the admonition of "compensatory" damages,
and can only be criticized on that basis.
C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1177 (1931) (footnotes omitted).
5. Although exemplary damages were recognized
at the common law as early as 1763, see Huckle
v. Money, 2 Wils. 206 (K.B.I763), and the practice of awarding exemplary damages was well
recognized when the United States Constitution
was adopted, see Browning-Ferris Indus, of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
274, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2919, 106 L.Ed.2d 219
(1989), this court rejected the common law rule
in Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884).
In response to Hobbs, the General Assembly in
1889 enacted a statute permitting an award of
reasonable exemplary damages "for a wrong
done to the person, or to personal or real prop-

erty/' when the jury, in addition to awarding
actual damages, finds that "the injury complained of shall have been attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton
and reckless disregard of the injured party's
rights and feelings." 1889 Colo.Sess.Laws 6465.
6. Section 13-21-102(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987), authorizes a court to reduce or disallow exemplary
damages to the extent that:
(a) The deterrent effect of the damages has
been accomplished; or
(b) The conduct which resulted in the
award has ceased; or
(c) The purpose of such damages has otherwise been served.
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one-third interest to the state comes into
play.

property interest created in the judgment
creditor by virtue of the judgment itself.

C.

III.

[1] Property interests emanate from
We next consider the concept of "taking"
state law, and there is no question that as it relates to the federal and state constiunder Colorado law a judgment for exem- tutional proscriptions against the governplary damages qualifies as a property in- mental taking of private property without
just compensation. The Fifth Amendment
terest.
The term "property" includes a multi- to the United States Constitution states in
plicity of interests and is commonly used general terms that private property shall
to denote everything that is the subject not "be taken for public use, without just
of ownership, whether tangible or intan- compensation." This provision is made apgible, as well as those rights and inter- plicable to the states under the Fourteenth
ests which have value to the owner. See Amendment to the United States ConstituBlack's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. tion. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
1979). The concept of property, there- New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 98 S.Ct.
fore, encompasses those enforceable con- 2646, 2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Article
tractual rights that traditionally have II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution
more specifically states that "[pjrivate
been recognized as choses in action.
property
shall not be taken or damaged, for
Baker v. Young, 798 P.2d 889, 893 (Colo.
public
or
private use, without just compen1990).
sation" and that "the question whether the
Because the term "property" includes a contemplated use be really public shall be a
"legal right to damage for an injury," Rojudicial question, and determined as such
sane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d
without regard to any legislative assertion
372, 375 (1944), it necessarily follows that
that the use is public."
the term "property" also includes the judgment itself, which creates an independent
A.
legal right to full satisfaction from the
"goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and
The Taking Clause of both the federal
real estate of every person against whom and state constitutions is "designed to bar
any judgment is obtained." § 13-52- Government from forcing some people
102(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987). The filing of a alone to bear public burdens which, in all
certified transcript of the judgment with fairness and justice, should be borne by the
the county clerk and recorder creates a public as a whole." Penn Central Transp.
"lien upon all the real property of such Co., 438 U.S. at 123, 98 S.Ct at 2659; see
judgment debtor, not exempt from execu- also Board of County CommWs of Sation in such county, owned by him or which guache County v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d
he may afterwards acquire until said lien 975, 983 (Colo.1984). Resolving the quesexpires." Id; see generally Evans v. City tion of "what constitutes a taking" is a
of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. problem of considerable difficulty, and
1982) (final judgment no longer subject to courts have been unable "to develop any
modification is vested property right); 'set formula' for determining when 'justice
Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation and fairness* require that economic injuries
Comm'r, 123 W.Va. 621, 17 S.E.2d 330, 334 caused by public action be compensated by
(1941) (judgment is "property" and as such the government, rather than remain disprois proper subject of constitutional protec- portionately concentrated on a few pertion). Indeed, the statutory disavowal in sons." Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 983 (quotsection 13-21-102(4) of any state interest in ing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at
a claim for exemplary damages "at any 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659); see Pennsylvania
time prior to payment becoming due" is an Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43
implicit legislative acknowledgement of the S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (when
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governmental regulation "goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking").
[2] The determination of whether a
"taking" has occurred by reason of a governmental regulation interfering with or
impairing the interest of a private property
owner involves essentially an "ad hoc, factual" analysis. Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383,
390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). In resolving a
"taking" issue, the United States Supreme
Court has considered the totality of circumstances underlying the taking, including
such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and
its interference with reasonable economic
expectations of the property owner. See
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co,, 467 U.S.
986, 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874, 81 L.Ed.2d
815 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035,
7. The facts in McCullough prompted the United
States Supreme Court to preface its opinion
with the statement that "[pjerhaps no litigation
has been more severely contested or has
presented more intricate and troublesome questions than that which has arisen under the coupon legislation of Virginia." 172 U.S. at 106, 19
S.Ct. at 135. The basic facts in McCullough
were as follows. In 1871 the Virginia Assembly
passed an act for the refunding of the public
debt. The act authorized the issuance of new
coupon bonds for two-thirds of the old bonds,
thereby leaving the other one-third as the basis
of an equitable claim upon the state. The statute provided that "[t]he coupons shall be payable semi-annually, and be receivable at and
after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues and
demands due the State, which shall be so expressed on their face." Id. at 103, 19 S.Ct. at
134. Under the 1871 act, therefore, a large
amount of the state's outstanding debt was refunded.
The refunding scheme, however,
proved to be unpopular, and after 1871 there
was repeated legislation tending to mitigate the
effects of the 1871 statute. In 1872 the Virginia
Assembly passed a statute stating that it shall
not be "lawful for the officers" charged with the
collection of taxes or other demands of the
State, due now or that shall hereafter become
due, to receive in payment thereof anything else
than gold or silver coin, United States Treasury
notes, or notes of the national banks of the
United States." Id. In a series of cases, the
United States Supreme Court upheld state statutes authorizing the payment of taxes in coupon
bonds. Eg., Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S.
672, 26 L.Ed. 271 (1880); Antoni v. Greenhow,
107 U.S. 769, 27 L.Ed. 468 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 5 S.Ct. 962, 29 L.Ed. 207

2041, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 175, 100 S.Ct. at 390. An
additional factor, and one entitled to considerable
weight, is whether the property
ri ht h a s
£
ripened into a judgment. Where
a
private property interest emanates directft from a final judgment, the longstanding
r
ule, announced by the Supreme Court in
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102,
123-24, 19 S.Ct. 134, 141-42, 43 L.Ed. 382
(1898), and consistently followed by other
courts, is that such a property interest
cannot be diminished by legislative fiat:
It is not within the power of a legislature
to take away rights which have been
once vested by a judgment. Legislation
may act on subsequent proceedings, may
abate actions pending, but when those
actions have passed into judgment the
power of the legislature to disturb the
rights created thereby ceases.^
(1885); Royall v. Virginia, 121 U.S. 102, 7 S.Ct.
826, 30 L.Ed. 883 (1887); McGahey v. Virginia,
135 U.S. 662, 10 S.Ct. 972 (1890).
In 1882, the Virginia Assembly again passed a
statute which, in effect, provided that a taxpayer
seeking to use coupons in payment of his taxes
should pay the taxes in money at the time of
tendering the coupons and thereafter bring a
suit to establish the genuineness of the coupons
and that, if the suit be decided in the taxpayer's
favor, the taxpayer would obtain from the treasurer a return of the money paid. The Virginia
Assembly also passed in that year an act declaring that tax collectors should receive in payment of taxes and other dues "gold, silver, United States Treasury notes, national bank currency and nothing else." Id. at 104. This statute
also contained a provision permitting a lawsuit
by one claiming that such exaction was illegal
and also provided that there shall be no other
remedy and no writ of mandamus or prohibition or any other writ or process shall issue to
hinder or delay the collection of revenue.
In 1892 McCullough filed an action in the
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to establish
the genuineness of certain coupons that he had
tendered in payment of taxes. The action was
commenced pursuant to the terms of the 1882
statute, which authorized the filing of such an
action as the exclusive remedy for one challenging the requirement that taxes be paid in gold,
silver, or United States currency. McCullough
sought to establish the genuineness of certain
coupon bonds for the payment of his taxes.
The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk rendered judgment in McCullough's favor, but in
1894, after the judgment was rendered, the Virginia Assembly repealed the 1882 statute authorizing the litigation commenced by McCullough.
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See generally Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S.
600, 603, 43 S.Ct. 435, 436, 67 L.Ed. 819
(1923); Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C.Cir.
1974); Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist, 307
Ky. 689, 211 S.W.2d 867, 873 (1948); Stone
v. McKay Plumbing Co., 200 Miss. 792, 30
So.2d 91, 92-93 (1947); Karrer v. Karrer,
190 Neb. 610, 211 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1973);
Inman v. Railroad Comm}n, 478 S.W.2d
124, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); City of Norfolk v. Stephenson, 185 Va. 305, 38 S.E.2d
570, 575 (1946).
B.
Because a judgment for exemplary damages entitles the judgment creditor to a
satisfaction out of the real and personal
property of the judgment debtor, the taking of a money judgment from the judgment creditor is substantially equivalent to
the taking of money itself. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 L.Ed.2d 358
(1980), the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a state statute authorizing a county to take the interest accruing
on an interpleader fund deposited into the
registry of the county court under circumstances where another statute imposed a
fee for the clerk's services in receiving the
fund into the registry. The Court rejected
the notion that the statute created a valid
fee for services and held that the county's
retention of the interest fund violated the
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Acknowledging that a state may deny a
property owner the beneficial use of property or may restrict the owner's full exploitation of property so long as such action is

justified as promoting the general welfare,
the Court reasoned that the state had not
merely adjusted the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common
good, but had exacted "a forced contribution to general governmental revenues . . .
not reasonably related to the costs of using
the courts," 449 U.S. at 163, 101 S.Ct. at
452, and then concluded:
To put it another way: a State, by ipse
dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of
the deposit in court. This is the very
kind of thing that the Taking Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield
against the arbitrary use of governmental power.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at
164, 101 S.Ct. at 452.
In contrast to Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, the Court in United States v. Sperry
Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107
L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), found no unconstitutional taking of money under a federal
statute that required the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to deduct llh% from the
first $5 million dollars of an arbitration
award entered by the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. The purpose of the statutory deduction was to reimburse the United
States government for the expenses incurred in the administration of the arbitration program. Acknowledging that the
amount of a user fee need not "be precisely
calibrated to the use that a party makes of
government services," the Court concluded
that the statutory deductions were not "so
clearly excessive as to belie their purported
character as user fees," stating:

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the judgment in McCullough's favor, dismissed his petition, and awarded costs to the
state. It was under this sequence of events that
the United States Supreme Court held that the
judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the
City of Norfolk pursuant to the 1882 act was
rightfully entered and that the rights acquired
by that judgment under the 1882 act could not
be disturbed by the subsequent repeal of the
statute in 1894.
The rule adopted in McCullough applies to
private property rights acquired under a judgment and does not apply to an action to enforce

a public right. An action to enforce a public
right, "even after it has been established by the
judgment of the court, may be annulled by
subsequent legislation and should not be thereafter enforced; although, in so far as a private
right has been incidentally established by such
judgment, as for special damages to the plaintiff
or for his costs, it may not be thus taken away."
Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04, 43 S.Ct.
435, 436-37, 67 L.Ed. 819 (1923); see Atlantic
City Casino Assoc, v. City of Atlantic City, 217
NJ.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109, 1113 (1985); City
of Norfolk v. Stephenson, 185 Va. 305, 38 S.E.2d
570, 575 (1946).
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This is not a situation where the Government has appropriated all, or most, of the
award to itself and labeled the booty as a
user fee
We need not state what
percentage of the award would be too
great a take to qualify as a user fee, for
we are convinced that on the facts of this
case, 1V2% does not qualify as a "taking"
by any standard of excessiveness.
110 S.Ct. at 394-95 (citations and footnote
omitted).

for exemplary damages is designed to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar conduct by others, it is only available when a
civil wrong has been committed under extremely aggravating circumstances and
when the injured party has a successful
claim for actual damages against the
wrongdoer. Harding Glass Co., Inc., 640
P.2d at 112. In that sense, an exemplary
damages award is not totally devoid of any
and all reparative elements. More impor-

[3] The rule to be gleaned from Webb's ^ ^ t h e f o r c e d c o n t r i b u t i o n o f o n e " t h i r d
Fabulous Pharmacies and Sparry is that, o f t h e exemplary damages judgment is imin order to withstand a constitutional dial- P o s e d n o t o n t h e d e f e n d a n t wrongdoer who
lenge to a governmental appropriation of a c a u s e d t h e i n J u r i e s b u t u P o n t h e P l a i n t i f f
significant part of a money judgment under w h o suffered the wrong. It goes without
the Taking Clause of the United States saying that placing the burden of payment
Constitution, the governmental appropria- o n t h e Judgment creditor who suffered the
tion must bear a reasonable relationship to w r o n S b e a r s n o reasonable relationship to
the governmental services provided to civil a n y arguable goal of punishing the wronglitigants in making use of the judicial pro- d o e r o r deterring others from engaging in
cess for the purpose of resolving the civil s i m i l a r conduct. Cf Bankers Life & Casuclaim resulting in the judgment. We adopt altV Co> v- Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 108
that rule as the controlling norm for resolv- S C t - 1645 > 1 0 ° L-Ed.2d 62 (1988) (statutory
ing the taking issue in this case.
imposition of 15% penalty on party who
unsuccessfully appeals money judgment
IV.
upheld on basis that means chosen were
[4] We turn to Kirk's claim that the sufficiently related to state's interest in
requirement of section 13-21-102(4) that he discouraging frivolous appeals to satisfy
pay to the state general fund one-third of E < * u a l Protection Clause),
all exemplary damages collected on his
Section 13-21-102(4) does not sat
[ M J
judgment constitutes a taking of private i s f y t h e c r i t e r i a {m a n ad valormi
proper.
property without just compensation in vio- t y tex W h e r 6 ( M h e r e > a 8 t a t u t e , g o b v i o u s
lation of the Taking Clause of the United p u r p o s e ^ to p r o d u c e r e v e n u e for t h e g t a t e
States and Colorado Constitutions. Al- general fund, the statute must conform to
though several types of revenue-raising the state constitutional requirement that all
and regulatory measures are available to a texes u p o n e a c h o f t h e v a r i o u s d a s s e s o f
legislative body, we believe it will be help- r e a , a n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y b e « uniform >.
ful to briefly explain why the forced contri- a n d b e ] e v i e d u n d e r g e n e r a ] l a w g p r e s c r i b .
bution of section 13-21-102(4) fails to satis- i n g s u c h r e g u i a tions as shall secure just
fy the legal criteria for any of these mea- a n d e q u a l v a l u a t i o n s o f a l l p r o p e r t y , whethsures
*
er real or personal. Colo. Const, art. X,
[5] Section 13-21-102(4) does not quali- § 3. In Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400,
fy as a valid penalty or forfeiture. The 26 P.2d 1051 (1933), this court invalidated a
Colorado exemplary damages statute, we statute which imposed an additional regishave held, is not a penal statute in the tration fee upon motor vehicles based on
sense of creating a new and distinct cause their value. In so holding, we emphasized
of action for a civil penalty, but instead that the purpose of the statute was to raise
"merely authorizes increased damages an- general revenues but was applicable only
ciliary to an independent claim for actual to motor vehicles and to no other kinds of
damages." Palmer, 684 P.2d at 214. As personal property. Walker, 93 Colo, at
we previously observed, while a judgment 405-06, 26 P.2d at 1053. In similar fash-
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ion, section 13-21-102(4) is designed to tutes a user fee imposed on plaintiffs who
raise revenues for the state general fund, successfully utilize the civil justice system
but is limited only to personal property in in obtaining an exemplary damages award.
the form of a judgment for exemplary dam- A user fee is in the nature of a special fee
ages and has no applicability at all to any designed to defray the cost of a governother form of private property, real or per- mental service and is imposed on the users
of that service. See generally Bloom, 784
sonal.
P.2d at 308; Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v.
[8] Section 13-21-102(4) does not qualiCity and County of Denver, 676 P.2d
fy as a valid excise tax. In contrast to a
1170, 1174-75 (Colo.1984). A valid user fee
direct tax on property, an excise tax is not
need not be designed with mathematical
based on the assessed value of the property
precision
to defray the cost of the service
subject to the tax, but rather is imposed on
for
which
the fee is imposed, but must bear
a particular act, event, or occurrence.
some
reasonable
relationship to the overall
Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d
cost
of
that
service.
Bloom, 784 P.2d at
304, 307 (Colo. 1989); Walker, 93 Colo, at
308;
Loup-Miller
Constr.
Co., 676 P.2d at
403-07, 26 P.2d at 1052-53. "The object of
1175-76.
an excise tax, like that of an ad valorem
property tax, is to provide revenue for the
[10] Section 13-21-102(4) fails to qualigeneral expenses of government, but, unfy
as a valid user fee. The payment relike the ad valorem property tax, the payquired
of the judgment creditor under secment of the excise tax is made a condition
tion
13-21-102(4)
is not allocated to the
precedent to the act, event, or occurrence
cost
of
funding
the
civil justice system, nor
on which the tax is based." Bloom, 784
are
the
funds
earmarked
for a specific purP.2d at 307-08; see Cherry Hills Farms,
pose
remotely
connected
with the judicial
Inc. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 670
process.
In
a
manner
similar
to the statuP.2d 779, 782 (Colo. 1983). Even if we astory
taking
of
interest
on
an
interpleader
sume that an excise tax on a money judgfund
invalidated
in
Webb's
Fabulous
Pharment could survive a constitutional chalmacies,
449
U.S.
155,
101
S.Ct.
446,
section
lenge under article II, section 6, of the
Colorado Constitution, which mandates 13-21-102(4) exacts a forced contribution in
that justice "be administered without sale," order to provide general governmental revsection 13-21-102(4) imposes the burden of enues and does so in a manner and to a
payment not on all persons using the civil degree not reasonably related to the cost of
justice system, nor for that matter on all using the courts. The consideration resuccessful plaintiffs, but only on those ceived by judgment creditors subject to the
plaintiffs who obtain a judgment for exem- forced contribution created by section 13plary damages and then only when the 21-102(4) is the use of the courts in resolvaward is collected. An excise tax imposed ing their civil disputes. The General Asonly on such a limited class of persons sembly, however, has imposed filing fees
exercising their right to use the courts, and other fees on persons using the civil
while other persons exercising the same justice system in order to defray a signifiright are not subject to the tax, would be cant part of the costs in funding that asso underinclusive as not to withstand even pect of the judicial process. See §§ 13-32the rational-basis standard of review under 101 to -104, 6A C.R.S. (1987 & 1990 Supp.);
equal protection analysis. See generally § 13-71-144, 6A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). SecTassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo.1987) tion 13-21-102(4) thus has the effect of
(chief judge's directive prohibiting pro se forcing a select group of citizens—persons
litigants from paying filing fees by person- who obtain a judgment for exemplary damal check violative of equal protection of ages and are successful in collecting on the
judgment—to bear a disproportionate burlaws under Colorado Constitution).
den of funding the operations of state
[9] The only conceivable justification government, which, "in all fairness and jusfor section 13-21-102(4) is that it consti- tice, should be borne by the public as a
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tion 13-21-102(4) passes the line of constitutional propriety by taking one-third of a
The fact that a legislative body might collected civil judgment for exemplary damchoose to eliminate exemplary damages in ages notwithstanding the fact that the
civil cases without offending due process of state has affirmatively disavowed, pursulaw is not to say that any restriction what- ant to the statute itself, "any interest in
ever on an exemplary damages award will the claim for exemplary damages or in the
pass constitutional muster. See Pacific litigation itself at any time prior to the
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, — payment becoming due." Such statutory
taking of one-third of the collected judgU.S.
,
, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1054, 113
ment is direct and absolute, and its economL.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In
our view, forcing a judgment creditor to ic impact cannot be described as anything
pay to the state general fund one-third of a less than substantial.
To be sure, section 13-21-102(4) purports
judgment for exemplary damages in order
to fund services which have already been to create a state interest in one-third of the
funded by other revenue-raising measures, monies collected on the judgment and in
and without conferring on the judgment that respect arguably might be read to
creditor any benefit or service not fur- defeat any reasonable economic expectanished to other civil litigants not required tion on the part of the judgment creditor to
to make the same contribution, amounts to the total judgment. The statutory repudiaan unconstitutional taking of the judgment tion of any state interest in the tort litigacreditor's property in violation of the Tak- tion or in the judgment itself, however,
ing Clause of the United States and the affirmatively belies any notion that the
Colorado Constitutions. Cf Ochs v. Town judgment creditor's property interest in the
of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, judgment is less than total. Given the
461-62, 407 P.2d 677, 680 (1965) (enforce- legislative disaffirmance of any stake in
ment of municipal "frontage tax" on real the exemplary damages award prior to colproperty without any corresponding benefit lection, it would border on the fanciful
to property results in "taking private prop- were we to characterize the judgment crederty without compensation, and without itor's expectation to a full satisfaction of
the judgment as unreasonable, especially
due process of law").8
since upon entry of the judgment there is
no preexisting claim on the part of the
state to any part of the judgment. The
In urging us to uphold the constitutional- state's asserted interest is not in the judgity of section 13-21-102(4), the Attorney ment itself but in the monies collected on
General argues that no taking occurs at all the judgment, and that interest arises only
because a judgment creditor does not have at a point in time after the judgment credia property interest in one-third of the judg- tor's property interest in the judgment has
ment for exemplary damages. We find vested by operation of law. Moreover, the
this argument devoid of merit.
judgment itself results exclusively from
[11] The legislature may well abate or the judgment creditor's time, effort, and
diminish a pending civil action, but when expense in the litigation process without
that claim ripens into judgment "the power any assistance whatever from the state.
of the legislature to disturb the rights creWe need not turn this case, however, on
ated thereby ceases." McCullough, 172 a judgment creditor's reasonable economic
U.S. at 123-24, 19 S.Ct. at 141-142. Sec- expectation of a property interest in the
whole." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc., 449 U.S. at 163, 101 S.Ct. at 452.

8. The only case we have found dealing with a
rized the state's taking of seventy-five percent of
statutory provision similar to section 13-21all punitive damages in products liability cases,
102(4) is McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 was not rationally related to a legitimate state
RSupp. 1563 (M.D.Ga.1990). In that case, the
interest because the state provided no quid pro
court held that section 51-12-5.1(e)(2) of the
quo for the taking. 737 FSupp. at 1575-77.
Georgia Tort Reform Act of 1987, which autho-
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total judgment. We are satisfied that,
even if the expectation issue is viewed as a
close one, the cumulative effect of all
factors bearing on the "taking" issue
weighs heavily on the side of a constitutionally protected private property interest
on the part of the judgment creditor in the
exemplary damages award. These factors,
as previously noted, include the following:
the legislative renunciation of any interest
in the judgment prior to collection; the
absence of any demonstrable nexus between, on the one hand, any alleged governmental interest in punishing and deterring fraudulent, malicious, or willful and
wanton tortious conduct and, on the other,
the statutory imposition of the forced contribution on the person injured by the
wrongful conduct; and the gross disproportion between the statutory forced contribution and any governmental service made
available to the judgment creditor but not
otherwise funded by fees and other statutory assessments imposed on civil litigants
using the judicial process to resolve their
disputes. We thus conclude that section
13-21-102(4) constitutes a taking of a judgment creditor's private property interest in
an exemplary damages award without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article II, section
15, of the Colorado Constitution.
We accordingly reverse that part of the
district court's judgment upholding the constitutionality of section 13-21-102(4), and
we remand the case to that court with
directions to conform its judgment to the
views herein stated.
ROVIRA, C.J., dissents.
LOHR, J., joins in the dissent.
Chief Justice ROVIRA dissenting:
The majority holds that section 13-21102(4), 6A C.R.S. (1987), results in a forced
taking of a judgment creditor's property in
violation of both the United States and
Colorado Constitutions. Because I believe
that a claim for exemplary damages is
purely a statutory right and such a claim
may be limited or conditioned by the legislature, no taking of a property right results

when an award of exemplary damages has
been obtained pursuant to the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
Based on plaintiffs claim for malicious
prosecution against the Denver Publishing
Company, a jury awarded him exemplary
damages in the amount of $160,500. At
the time plaintiff brought his claim, section
13-21-102(4) was in effect and provided
that one-third of any exemplary damages
award collected must be paid to the state
general fund. In addition, section 13-21102(l)(a) provided that exemplary damages
should not exceed the amount of actual
damages unless exceptional circumstances
justify an increase. §§ 13-21-102(l)(a) and
13-21-102(3), 6A C.R.S. (1987). In order to
comply with the statute, plaintiff requested
that his exemplary damages award be reduced so as not to exceed the amount of
actual damages awarded. Pursuant to his
request, the trial court reduced the exemplary damages award to $118,980. Plaintiff also requested the trial court to find
section 13-21-102(4) unconstitutional. The
trial court refused.
On appeal plaintiff contends that the legislative requirement that a portion of an
exemplary damages judgment actually collected be paid into the state's general fund
is an unconstitutional taking of property.
Although plaintiff has raised other constitutional issues, the majority relies only on
the "taking" issue in arriving at the conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional.
II
The majority reasons that the entire
judgment for exemplary damages is a property interest of the plaintiff and that if the
state takes a portion such taking is unconstitutional.
To arrive at this conclusion, the majority
examines the nature of an award for exemplary damages, and finds that compensatory damages and exemplary damages are
related and dependent on one another, both
having similar reparative functions. Compensatory damages serve a primary repara-
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tive function of making the injured party ing such damages. First, the wrong giving
whole, while exemplary damages, although rise to exemplary damages must be attenddesigned to punish and deter, contemplate ed by circumstances of fraud, malice, or
the severity of the injury perpetrated on willful and wanton conduct. Second, the
the injured party by the wrongdoer as well, amount of an exemplary damages award
may not exceed the actual damages awardthus also serving a reparative function.
ed
without circumstances justifying an inBecause the term property includes a
crease.
Third, the court may reduce an
"legal right to damage for an injury," it
exemplary
damages award if the deterrent
follows that the term property includes the
effect
has
been
accomplished or if the purjudgment itself. Maj. op. at 267 (quoting
pose
has
been
served.
§§ 13-21-102(l)(a),
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149
(2)(a),
&
(c),
6A
C.R.S.
(1987). Finally, a
P.2d 372, 375 (1944)). According to the
claim
for
exemplary
damages
must be
majority, because section 13-21-102(4) conproven
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt,
while
templates the entry and actual collection of
compensatory
damages
may
be
proven
by a
a final judgment before the statutory grant
preponderance
of
the
evidence.
One
has
a
of one-third interest to the state comes into
play, the state is taking a property interest, right to compensatory damages when one
violating the Fifth Amendment of the Unit- has suffered an injury, but exemplary damed States Constitution and article II, sec- ages are allowed only in very limited circumstances.
tion 15 of the Colorado Constitution.
I do not dispute that a judgment is a
The two remedies may be interrelated, as
property right. I also agree that a "tak- the majority opinion suggests, but a claim
ing" of a judgment without compensation for exemplary damages is unique and
would be unconstitutional. I disagree how- should not be viewed as a legal right which
ever, based upon facts and law applicable is any greater than that provided by statto this case, that the plaintiff has a right to
ute.
the entire exemplary damages judgment.
Since a claim for exemplary damages
My disagreement is premised on the
ground that a claim for exemplary dam- arises from statute, such a claim may also
ages is a statutory right which may be be limited by statute. Kaitz v. District
conditioned by the legislature and thus the Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo.1982). If
entire judgment never vested in the plain- the legislature may completely eliminate
tiff.
exemplary damages in civil cases, as the
majority
concedes, the legislature may also
Exemplary damages were authorized by
statute to punish and deter conduct attend- place conditions on a statutory grant of
ed by circumstances of fraud, malice or authority to recover such damages. The
willful and wanton conduct. 1889 Colo. plaintiff recognized that the right to exemSess.Laws 64-65
Although exemplary plary damages is a statutory right, and
damages may have a negligible reparative that right is subject to legislative condifunction, it is well-established in Colorado tions. Plaintiff accepted the condition purthat punishment and deterrence is the es- suant to section 13-21-102(l)(a) which prosential purpose of exemplary damages. vides that exemplary damages must not
Seaward Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bradley, 817 exceed the amount of actual damages,
P.2d 971, 974 (Colo.1991); Mince v. But- when he requested that the exemplary
ters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); damages award be reduced from $160,500
French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504, 511, 36 P. to $118,980. Thus, plaintiff concedes that
609 (1894). The effort by the majority to exemplary damages may be limited by the
establish a link between actual and exem- legislature.
plary damages due to their reparative funcThe legislature cannot modify a judgtions is tenuous at best.
ment which is a property right, but the
The uniqueness of exemplary damages is
also demonstrated in the statute authoriz-

legislature is free to condition a claim for
exemplary damages which is allowed only
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pursuant to a statutory grant.1 "It is true
that the legislature can not pass an act
depriving a citizen of any vested right, but
to be a vested right, *[i]t must be something more than a mere expectation based
upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title,
legal or equitable, to the present or future
enjoyment of property — ' " Smith v.
Hill, 12 I11.2d 588, 592, 147 N.E.2d 321, 325
(1958) (quoting People ex rel Foote v.
Clark, 283 111. 221, 222, 119 N.E. 329, 330
(1918)). The Illinois court went on to hold
that a plaintiff is entitled to a cause of
action for damages actually sustained, but
a vested right to exemplary damages arises
only when such damages have been allowed by a judgment. "There being no
vested right in any plaintiff to exemplary,
punitive, vindictive or aggravated damages
the legislature may therefore restrict or
deny the allowance of such damages at its
will." Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 325.
Any property right plaintiff may have in
the award is limited as provided by the
statute. When the statute became effective, plaintiff had a "mere expectancy" in a
possible future exemplary damage award.
This expectancy was conditioned by onethird going to the state, and plaintiff was
aware of this at the time he filed his complaint.2

plaintiffs interests by conditioning the
state's right to receive payment until the
judgment has been collected. Since the
state is only entitled to receive its portion
of the exemplary damages award after collection has been successful, the plaintiff is
not harmed.
The majority is concerned that the
"forced contribution of one-third of the exemplary damages judgment is imposed not
on the defendant wrongdoer . . . but upon
the plaintiff who suffered the wrong."
Maj. op. at 270. I disagree. There is minimal burden placed on the plaintiff where,
as here, the plaintiff had a mere expectancy in exemplary damages, and where only a
portion of that received is contributed to
the state. Furthermore, the state's receipt
of one-third of an exemplary damages judgment does not negate the punishment of
the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer must pay
the entire exemplary damages judgment
regardless of who receives it.
It is not unreasonable for the legislature
to condition an exemplary damage award
where the purpose behind exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter
dangerous or malicious conduct. The legislature has recognized that exemplary damages are allowed for the benefit of the
public. In exercising its legislative powers,
the legislature appropriately decided that
the goal of benefitting society through exemplary damages awards required a portion of exemplary damages awards be paid
to the state.

Section 13-21-102(4) repudiates any state
interest in the tort litigation and prevents
collection by the state until the plaintiff
has collected the exemplary damages judgment. The majority reasons that this statAs I do not believe that the statute vioutory provision supports its conclusion that lates the taking clause of either the Colorathe judgment creditor has a full property do or the United States Constitutions, I am
interest in the entire exemplary damages confronted with the other constitutional
award. I disagree. The legislature, by claims not addressed in the majority opinthat provision, has sought to protect the ion.3 Because the majority reverses on the
1. Non-economic damages have also been limited by statute in order to prevent undue burden
on economic, commercial, and personal welfare. § 13-21-102.5, 6A C.R.S. (1987).
2. Expressed alternatively, a plaintiffs property
right in a judgment for punitive damages is

intrinsically subject to partial defeasance upon
collection by reason of the statutory scheme in
place at the time of entry of judgment. A plaintiff receives the full benefit of the property right
so described; there is no taking.
3. See maj. op. at 265 n. 3.
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taking clause issue it would serve no
worthwhile purpose to consider the other
constitutional issues raised by the plaintiff.
I respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that JUSTICE
LOHR joins in this dissent,
Yw\
£ lKiXi^

